03.01-- Abstract No:748
In this paper I shall explain ways in which attentional stability and vividness are meditatively developed in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition as a preparation for exploring the nature of consciousness and other mental phenomena. Such techniques are not necessarily linked to any one religious or metaphysical theory; indeed they have been practiced for centuries in Asia by contemplatives holding widely differing religious and philosophical views. Drawing upon such experience from Asian contemplative traditions may bring us closer to William James' vision of a science of the mind, namely one that would incorporate behavioral studies, neurophysiological research, and introspective observation.
Recognizing that the undisciplined mind is very prone to alternating attentional excitation and laxity, which severely hamper one's introspective abilities, the training of the attention in Tibetan Buddhism is centrally concerned with developing attentional stability and vividness. To understand these two qualities in terms of Buddhist psychology, one must note that Buddhists commonly assert that the continuum of awareness is composed of successive moments of cognition having finite duration. Moreover, commonly in a continuum of perception, many moments of awareness consist of non-ascertaining cognition; that is, objects appear to this inattentive awareness, but they are not ascertained. In terms of this theory, the degree of attentional stability increases in relation to the proportion of ascertaining moments of cognition of the intended object; that is, as stability increases, fewer and fewer moments of ascertaining consciousness are focused on any other than one's chosen object. This makes for a homogeneity of moments of ascertaining perception. The degree of attentional vividness corresponds to the ratio of moments of ascertaining to non-ascertaining cognition: the higher the frequency of ascertaining perception, the greater the vividness. Thus, the achievement of enhanced attentional stability and vividness entails an exceptionally high density of homogenous moments of ascertaining consciousness.
Such attentional stability and vividness are achieved through the cultivation of mindfulness and introspection. Mindfulness is defined as a mental faculty that enables one to attend continuously to a familiar object, without distraction. Introspection is understood as a type of metacognition by which one detects, for example, whether one's attention has fallen under the influence of either excitation or laxity. When the attention has been trained to an advanced state known as meditative quiescence, uninterrupted concentration occurs effortlessly, for hours on end, with unprecedented degrees of stability and vividness. This attainment is marked by an experienced shift in one's nervous system, by an internally generated sense of bliss, and by extraordinary mental and physical pliancy. Only the aspects of the sheer awareness, vividness, and joy of the mind appear, without the intrusion of any sensory objects. In this absence of appearances the continuum of one's attention may attend to previous moments of consciousness. Due to the homogeneity of this mental continuum, the experiential effect would be that of consciousness apprehending itself.
With the attainment of meditative quiescence, Tibetan Buddhists, like various other Asian contemplatives, assert that it is possible to develop various forms of extra-sensory perception and paranormal abilities. But the central purpose of training the attention in this way, according to Buddhism, is to develop insight into the fundamental nature of the mind. Such insight, it is believed, is necessary for eliminating the mind's tendency to fall prey to various afflictive emotions, such as greed, hatred, fear, and depression.
03.01-- Abstract No:988
In a series of experiments observers were presented in an annular area surrounding a fixation with two overlapped line figures each with a distinct color and instructed to pay active attention (e.g., by detecting slight changes in color or shape) to one figure and ignore the other. After a few seconds, most observers reported seeing the attended figure fading and subsequently disappeared from awareness and the ignored figure popping up from the background. The disappearance of the attended figure was accelerated by a sudden change in luminance or color of the unattended figure. These observations seem to demonstrate a deleterious effect of sustained selective attention on visual awareness. Comparisons were made with analogous psychophysical and behavioral effects, such as Troxler fading, the fading due to artificial stabilization of retinal images and "inhibition of return" effects. It is proposed that the neural mechanism for the observed phenomena most likely has to do with disruptions of the feedback-induced synchronization of neuronal firings at lateral geniculate nuclei and those at cortical centers responsible sustained visual attention.
03.01-- Abstract No:1087
Carefully designed experiments have shown that only a fraction of the information entering our eyes are consciously perceived at any given instant. A striking example of this is the phenomenon of binocular rivalry which occurs when the two eyes are stimulated with dissimilar stimuli. Visual perception during rivalry alternates unpredictably between the two dissimilar images. The image which is momentarily perceived is called the dominant image, and that which is not, the suppressed image. Other than its importance to binocular vision, binocular rivalry presents as a useful paradigm for examining how the brain guides and selects what information from the eye to the mind. Helmholtz was among one of the earliest to theorize that an involuntary attention mechanism, which has also recently been shown to play a role in gating information for other types of perception, underlies the selective perception of binocular rivalry. Confirming Helmholtz, our previous experiments have employed visual cuesto summon involuntary attention to a rivalry stimulus¹ location, resulting in that stimulus being perceived more frequently. Here we report some complementary experiments to add further support for our findings. We reasoned that if attention has a role in dominance, then denying attention to a rivalry stimulus should reduce its dominance. We compared rivalry dominance in two conditions. In the first focal attention condition, a visual cue was presented to a local region of an eye followed by the rivalry stimulus, to tilt rivalry dominance to the cued eye. In the second divided attention condition a similar cue was presented first, followed by a binocular vernier target, and the rivalry stimulus. For both conditions, the subjects were asked to identify the color of the rivalry grating perceived; in the second condition, the subjects were also asked to identify the vernier displacement. Predictably, rivalry dominance in the cued region will be reduced in the latter condition since attention (at the cue region) is now distracted to the vernier target. Indeed as predicted, we found that the rivalry target in the cued region became dominant less frequently inthe divided attention condition, where attention was lured to the vernier target. In a separate study to determine the potency of this attention mechanism, we asked if attention can revert a very weak rivalry stimulusto dominance. Thus, we presented a blank field to an eye and a highly contoured stimulus (grating) to the fellow eye. Typically such condition results in a rather stable perception of the grating alone. However, we found that when a remote visual cue (about 1 degree away) was presented to the eye viewing the blank field, it was able to wipe out the perception of the grating. That is, the visual cue successfully delivers the blank stimulus to conscious perception; and the remote placement of the cue suggests that its effectiveness stems from its ability to mediate the involuntary attention mechanism, rather than simply from its local contrast energy.
03.01-- Abstract No:1099
The concept of attention is notoriously vague. My paper is an attempt to specify the different meanings of the term "attention"; to display what they have in common, and show in what sense they differ from each other. Finally I will address the question why there exists no uniform definition of "attention".
Ever since William James (1890) first described attention as a process of selection among items not yet in consciousness, this has been the dominant interpretation of the term 'attention', i.e. a sort of selective mechanism. In some cases it is accurate to specify the concept by a selecting process. The ability to select a part of incoming sensory information and the focusing (of consciousness) on one cognitive task or experience, e.g., can both be described in terms of selection. In this interpretation the notion of a focusing act implies by definition that something else is ignored.
There are several aspects of attention which will not be captured in this simple duality. Firstly, 'to attend to something', refers both to the selecting act and to what has been selected. According to Wilhem Wundt (1911) 'attention' was that which made a content of consciousness clearer. According to this view attention not only selects it also clarifies. Another aspect of attention is that of degree. To be more or less attentive is not always the same thing as being more or less selective. I will emphasise that there is an 'intensifying' dimension to the concept, as well as a selective one and relate this to the question of degree of consciousness.
Finally, I will examine an issue which I think has been especially neglected and that is the problematic relation between 'attention' and 'consciousness'. I will argue that to do something attentively does not necessarily mean that we are consciously aware of what we are doing. An influential theory offered by Shriffin&Schneider (1977) makes a distinction between 'automatic' and 'controlled' processes, where only the last category requires attention. This, however, is only true if we treat attention as an act of conscious awareness. There is another meaning of 'attention' which can be described with reference to how the task is performed, instead of what it is like to perform it. In this sense, the meaning of 'attention' applies to 'automatic' as well as to 'controlled' processes. The automatic performance of a task is also under cognitive control, even though it is not conscious. This kind of performance can be carried out more or less attentively as well. I will argue that the only reason why the two processes have not traditionally been subject for the same kind of explanation, is the firm belief that attention is dependent upon conscious awareness.
In my paper I will further elaborate on these matters and connect them with the error of not distinguishing between phenomenological and explanatory use. As we have seen, not all aspects of the term can be captured in the subjective description of an experience.
03.01-- Abstract No:1122
Many writers have commented on the equation of attention with consciousness. While 'consciousness' encompasses a broad conceptual terrain, 'attention' has the advantage of encompassing a relatively discrete set of phenomena, some of which are accessible both to the subject and to others. 'Attention' also connotes an active motivational component to attaining or re-activating knowledge relating it to priorities for action. A model of consciousness centered on attention might yield a conceptual framework that brings cognitive and neurobiological research and psychoanalytic clinical practice in closer dialogue. The perceptual illusions associated with psychological treatment and Rorschach testing are discussed as a test of the model.
Rather than define attention largely in terms of focal attention, proposed here is a view of attention as primarily enabling the extraction of patterns and noting novelties in sensory experience both within and around an area of concentration In the open-ended flow of real-world situations, patterns and anomalies noted are dependent upon the organism's genetic and learning history as well as current need state, yielding a constant recursive re-entry of stimuli from world to organism, organism to world (Edelman 1989) . While, as James (1890) described, the attentional focus is the center of awareness, activated sensory memory (Cowan 1995) and activated long-term memories represent threshold states around focal awareness that may be available for enhanced selection and organization into meaningful information. Via Bucci (1993) , the levels of consciousness in this model are the sub-symbolic mode emphasized by parallel-distributed processing models, non-verbal symbolic (e.g. imagery) , and verbal symbolic modes, the latter of which is most accessible to control by the organism. Attentional processes, inclusive of the activation of sensory and long-term memory, facilitate the organization of stimuli first into patterns then into symbolic modes, thereby expanding the organism's potential for varied responses to environmental demands.
A taxonomy of interrelated attentional processes could facilitate research and practice in this area. Starting on the micro-level, a moment-to-moment mapping of attentional acts and events describes a portion of the fine-structure of consciousness. An attentional structure constitutes a perceptual tool adapted for a particular task, role, or situation, itself a composite of attentional frames which specialize in recognizing features of objects and their relationships. Activated by stimuli originating both in the environment and in the organism, these frames are in turn redeployed across attentional structures. Common frames and frame configurations across structures could then represent the individual's attentional style, an analogue of personality that is dependent upon genetic, cultural and learning history.
Both Rorschach phenomena and transference in psychoanalytic treatment are illusions that might be usefully explained by the current model; in the former an inkblot and in the latter another person are presented as stimuli for interpretation by an observer. While a controversial area, regularities in an observer's organization of such stimuli have been interpreted by clinicians as yielding important information about an individual's mental life. The proposed model of attentional style incorporates both illusory and object-centered forms of consciousness, allowing for a more inclusive understanding of the variety of experience within and between individuals.
Bucci, W. (1994) . The multiple code theory and the psychoanalytic process: a framework for research. Annual of Psychoanalysis, 243-263.
Cowan, N. (1995) . Attention and memory: an integrated framework. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Edelman, G. (1989) . The remembered present: a biological theory of consciousness. New York: Basic Books.
James, W. (1890) . The principles of psychology. New York: Henry Holt.
03.01-- Abstract No:1180
We are seeking design principles for intelligent systems that can interact with very complex, variable, and poorly modeled environments, in the presence of high-dimensional inputs and massive memory. As we will show below, we believe this can be accomplished by borrowing ideas from neurophysiology and psychology, in particular the idea of ''awareness".
We created a complex environment in a computer game "Desert Survival". Two opponent Sheiks have an army of camels each, and are trying to overtake each other's oases in order to make money. The camels can perform some simple tasks without supervision, namely navigate, buy water (necessary for their survival) and take over an opponent's oasis, if it contains less than a critical number of camels. The Sheiks coordinate the camels' actions in real time. The desert is a 100 x 100 grid with 144 oases. Each sheik start with 50 camels. Solving "Desert Survival" by exhaustive calculation is computationally prohibitive.
Inspired by visual psychophysics, we limit the range of action of each Sheik to an "attentional window" of size A x A, where 5 < A < 25. At any given moment, the center of the window is the "salient" or "most interesting" location in the desert from the Sheik's perspective, namely the location where the Sheik is most vulnerable compared to his opponent. Once the attentional window is located, the Sheik decides where to send his camels that are inside the window based on a probabilistic algorithm. A Sheik who applies such an algorithm makes approximately 20% more money against a randomized control Sheik (whose camels pick random targets) for A between 15-17. Performance drops to chance if A < 10 because there is not enough information inside the attentional window, or if A > 20 because then the Sheik does not manage to process all the information in real time.
We also endowed the Sheiks with memory, which allows them to adapt their strategies between aggressive and restrained according to the evaluation of past decisions taken in similar situations. The result of the memory search is merged with the attentional search result to form the basis of the Sheiks' decision. We compared a memory-endowed Sheik against a control who follows the algorithm with A=15 but without adaptation. The adaptive Sheik makes 100% more money if he also has A=15. He performs below chance if A < 11 because learning with few variables is not meaningful, and his gain drops to only 20% if A > 17, because then learning cannot be completed within the time allotted. The principal idea inherent in our architecture is to endow the system with a compact representation of the relevant events in "Desert Survival" within a specified attentional window and to make this information available to the planning and memory stages of the algorithm. Clearly, knowing all of the information throughout the desert would lead to optimal performance, but only when the time needed to evaluate this information is not taken into consideration. In the real world, a compact and selective way of selecting much -- but not all -- of the relevant information for planning and memory purposes can lead to better performance as shown here. This is very much reminiscent of the role accorded to the neuronal correlate of awareness in the primate brain by Crick and Koch (1995) . The computational paradigm developed and tested with the aid of "Desert Survival" can be applied to many technological applications, such as autonomous robots, intelligent buildings, interactive conference software, city traffic control, and high-performance chess without a supercomputer.
03.02-- Abstract No:945
In questioning the existing classifications of illusions, this paper presents a different approach to these phenomena. Traditional studies suffer from certain inadequacies. Firstly, it is assumed, on a basis of the result of perception, that something goes wrong in the underlying processes. Hence, a perceptual error is suggested. Secondly, the view is taken that illusions can only be explained by additional assumptions; therefore a theory of perception cannot be at the same time a theory of illusions.
This paper developes the classical approach of explaining both perception and illusion by means of the same principles- the same rules of perceptual data processing are involved in both cases. If what the perceptual system measures does not fit our expectations, we are surprised by the result. Then we regard it as an effect of a breakdown of perceptual mechanism. However, it would as well be an accomplishment on the level of function. An idea is proposed that both results of normal and illusory perception depend on how information is corrected by perceptual system. Two kinds of correction are discussed.
As far as our daily experience is concerned the average observer is very seldom aware of illusions. Nevertheless, even if she is conscious that a phenomenon perceived is an illusion, the processes of perceptual functioning are rarely questioned. A discrepancy between what is perceived and what is objectively present in the world is not astonishing for the normal observer. This happens because under most everyday circumstances the data from perceptual systems are used adequately by perceivers in their actions- the fact consistent with a dual processing model. In fact, perception is also independent of other cognitive processes, especially of our arbitrary linguistic conventions.
This study suggests a new explanation of pitch and tritone paradox, indicates that illusions are cases of normal perception and proposes a new classification. Finally, an idea is developed that an assessment of results of perception can be regarded as a fundamental conscious process.
03.02-- Abstract No:1042
Patients with lesions in visual cortex (v1) lacks conscious visual awareness, but exhibit a significant ability to detect stimuli (blindsight) . Blindsight has been reported even in normal observers (Kolb & Braun, 1995, Nature, 337, 336) .
They showed observers locate the texture contrast reliably but did not consciously experience it, using superimposing complementary motion in orthogonal orientation. We report the blindsight in transparent visual motion detection using normal observers. Motion transparency can be seen with two independent sets of random dots moving in opposite directions in the same location in the visual field, and is defined as the perception of multiple velocity field in the visual space. About a hundred pairs of dots moving to opposite direction were generated on 8 x 8 deg CRT screen. Each pairs of dots moved in random temporal period at velocity of 0.75 deg/s for 252 ms duration. Pairs of dots were moved in cross-motion (0-180, 45-225, 90-270, and 135-315 deg in polar coordinates) , or in random motion. Inter-dot separation was changed from 2 to 15 pixels and the observer was asked to report whether he/she could see coherent motion using 5AFC procedure. The results suggest this displays which contain conflicting visual features, i.e. opposite motion, induced blindsight. The dissociation between visual performance and awareness is observed when the separation was small.
03.02-- Abstract No:1067
It is generally accepted that it takes time for visual awareness of an exposed stimulus to emerge. One of the potentially interesting theoretical questions could be posed this way: is the temporal lag of the observer's visual experience of an isoluminant stimulus constant, or is it a variable of the spatiotemporal availability of the stimulus? As based on a simple experimental design, it is possible to show that the subjective latency is a decreasing function of the spatiotemporal availability of the stimulus, i.e. the longer the exposure of the dynamic visual signal, the shorter the latency for that signal to reach awareness. Two laterally moving vertical lines are exposed so that the motion path of the upper line is separated from the motion path of the lower line along the vertical dimension. The upper line appears and disappears in an aperture, however the lower line moves accross the whole display screen. The position of the aperture line is slightly shifted towards the direction of motion from the position that would satisfy collinearity of the lines. Observers of this dynamic display report the following visual impression: at the very first moment of the appearance of the aperture line it seems to be lagging behind the "permanently" moving line, however during the lateral sweep it seems to catch the spatial position of the lower line and moves past it. With systematic increase in the diameter of the aperture this effect gradually diminishes and disappears. This type of subjective acceleration vis-a-vis objective motion parameters as a function of stimulus availability refers to the necessary acceleration in the process of establishing conscious visual representation after the very first moment of exposure to a stimulus. More systematic studies of subjective space-time distortions vis-a-vis objective kinematic properties of environmental events should reveal if these may have something to do with the very essence of the nature of visual consciousness -- the putative distortions in real-time representation of environmental events.
03.02-- Abstract No:1191
Background: Crick and Koch (1990) promote the idea that the visual system and visual awareness could provide a useful testing bed for developing a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Not only is the neural basis of the visual system reasonably well understood, but a host of ambiguous visual stimuli seem capable of exposing putative conscious mechanisms. One such stimulus is the well known Necker cube that generates two competing perceptual interpretations from the same visual input. The dynamic visual mechanisms that somehow 'bind' together the stimulus elements to give rise to the alternative percepts could form the foundation for visual subjective experience.
We agree with Crick and Koch in that the ambiguity of the Necker cube might be able to offer us an insight into visual awareness. In particular we are interested in the idea that an observer can consciously increase or decrease the rate of perceptual reversal between the competing interpretations of the Necker cube. Whereas Crick and Koch deliberately avoided a consideration of the nature of consciousness, specifically for example volition and intentionality, we used an observer's volition or 'conscious will' as our main independent variable.
Method: Practised observers viewed a single Necker cube figure for a period of 30 seconds. A perceptual reversal, a switch between the two possible perceptual interpretations, was indicated by a key press. A computer was used to present the stimulus and record the reversals.
Results: In the first study we found that our four observers experienced little difficulty either consciously increasing or decreasing the rate at which the Necker cube switched from one perceptual interpretation to another. In some cases observers were able to increase the number of reversals by up to two fold.
One possibility is that the observers deliberately employed guided eye movements to facilitate or inhibit perceptual reversals. In the next study, the same observers were required to restrict gaze to a small central region of the stimulus configuration in order to reduce the influence of eye movements. Observers still demonstrated the ability to alter the rate of reversal between the alternative perceptual interpretations at will.
Discussion: We take our results to mean that volition on the part of our observers influenced their subjective experience of the visual world. However, it is still possible to account for our data in terms of guided eye movements. It might also be the case that we simply recorded changes in the observer dependent criteria for what constitutes a perceptual reversal.
In a final demonstration we generated stimuli that comprised of at least two Necker cubes. With practice our observers were able to perceive the cubes switching independently. It is difficult to reconcile the observations using two or more Necker cubes within a scheme that attributes conscious control of perceptual reversals to voluntary guided eye movements or observer dependent criteria.
Crick F and Koch C (1990) Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness Seminars in The Neurosciences 2:263-275
03.02-- Abstract No:1192
Purpose Observers can consciously increase the rate at which the alternative perceptual interpretations of the Necker cube switch from one percept to the other (Goddard and Hamilton, this issue) . We were interested to know if perceptual reversals, switches from one interpretation to the other, could also be facilitated through suggestion.
Stimuli We used two versions of the Necker cube that were identical except that one of them contained much thicker lines. In control studies we found that the two versions gave rise to the same rates of reversal.
Procedure Ten participants were recruited who were naive to the purpose of the study. They were tested individually by first ensuring in a practice session that they were familiar with the Necker cube and then instructed to press a key whenever a perceptual reversal occurred. Next, they were presented with one version of the Necker cube and the number of reversals that occurred within a 30 second period was recorded. No feedback was provided. It was then suggested verbally by the experimenter that the next cube was expected to generate more reversals. The procedure was repeated to measure the number of reversals that occurred using the other version of the Necker cube.
Counterbalancing ensured that half of the participants were presented with one version of the Necker cube first, and the other half were presented with the other version first. All participants were given the same verbal suggestion. All participants were debriefed concerning the purpose of the study and asked for their accounts during the study.
Results and discussion Although most participants felt that the two cubes appeared to generate the same rate of perceptual reversal the results showed that all but one of the participants reported the second Necker cube as reversing more often than the first. The study was repeated using a different group of participants and this time the suggestion was that the second cube was expected to reduce the rate of reversal. Again, all but one of the participants reported fewer reversals using the second version of the cube.
One possibility is that the participants in our study were simply susceptible to the experimenter's suggestion so reported either more or fewer reversals depending on the suggestion given. Another possibility is that their visual experience was altered by suggestion.
Goddard P and Hamilton G (1998) Conscious control of perceptual reversals: eye movements or volition? (this issue?)
03.02-- Abstract No:1271
There is a complex relationship between consciousness and cognition in visual perception. It is now well understood that a great deal of our "conscious" visual experience of the world is illusory inasmuch as it goes beyond the information available to cognition. For example, the world appears to be visually available to us in equal detail far into the periphery, though the spatial resolution of the visual system drops off quite rapidly from the center of gaze. This illusory completion of visual detail is adaptive inasmuch as it would be pointless for peripheral perception to attribute ts own "blurriness" to the world. Thus the content of conscious perception is intended to be the world (it supports the illusion of direct perception) , though we know that actual visual information uptake is somewhat less direct.
The research I will describe was undertaken with the intention of examining strategies of visual information acquisition that might help to compensate for the failure of vision to actually encode the full visual scene with high resolution. A primary advantage of human eyes over cameras with similar optical defects is that the eyes move so as to focus high-resolution visual sampling capacity on points of interest. But what information guides those movements? How the visual system choose where to look next? Can it learn about implicitly available regulaties?
In a series of experiments I have been conducting, involving a total of about 50 participants to date, I have found that patterns of eye-movements during a visual search task can be modified when target acquisition is made surreptitiously contingent on eye-movement patterns. Using a high speed eye-tracking device, we are able, (during an eye- movement) to introduce a target onto the screen mid-trial, near the center of gaze at the landing location of the eye-movement. If target introduction is made contingent on particular eye-movement patterns, such as large eye-movements or clockwise vs counter-clockwise search patterns, then the latency within each trial prior to the participant emitting the triggering eye-movement pattern will reliably become shorter over a period of about 60 trials, a pattern which is not shown by control groups.
This novel implicit learning paradigm differs from many others (e.g., sequence learning and artificial grammars) in that the implicit structure is not overtly presented to the participants; they must discover it. On the other hand, unlike certain other game-like tasks, the participants are not aware that any structure exists to be learned. None of our participants ever detect the contingencies, though their patterns of eye-movements are strongly modified in a predictable manner. This kind of implicit visual learning is precisely the sort that can help to tune the information gathering capabilities of this perceptual system without affecting the naive subjective model individuals have of perception as a direct process.
03.02-- Abstract No:1354
The relations among consciousness, brain, behavior, and scientific explanation are explored within the domain of color perception. Current knowledge about color experience is summarized with particular attention to color similarity, color composition, dimensional structure, unique colors, and color categories. These phenomena are then used as empirical constraints in assessing the so-called "inverted spectrum argument" about the undetectability of color transformations. A symmetry analysis of color space shows that the classic form of this argument Q in effect, reversing the experience of a rainbow Q would not work for several reasons, but several other color-to-color transformations probably would. The approach is then generalized to examine behavioral detection of arbitrary differences in color experiences, leading to the formulation of a principled distinction, called the isomorphism constraint, between what can and cannot be determined about the nature of color experience by objective behavioral means. Finally, the prospects for achieving a biologically based explanation of color experience below the level of isomorphism are considered in light of the limitations of behavioral methods. Within-subject designs using biological interventions hold the greatest promise for scientific progress on consciousness, but objective knowledge of another person's experience appears impossible. The implications of these arguments for functionalism are discussed.
03.03-- Abstract No:851
Perceptual-cognitive processes are of conscious nature when the perceiving subjects are clearly aware of the stimulus (and vice versa) . It is a common sense experience that this is not always the case. Unconscious phenomena in olfaction seem to be more usual than in other sensory modalities, and there seem to exist good evolutionary reasons for this.
We are approaching this topic by estimating stimulus thresholds using psychophysical methods. In part, the experiments to be discussed were derived from subjective experience during detection threshold measurments in a randomized stimulus paradigm. The great majority of stimuli were so weak, under this condition, that the subjects were mostly guessing when detecting them. In spite of this, the incidence of correct detections was remarkably high even at low stimulus intensities. Thus the subjects correctly detected weak stimuli, although they were neither aware of these stimuli, nor of what they were actually doing: They were guessing on the presence or absence of weak odors in the stimulus bottles. The task was to design an experiment in which the above phenomenon could be studied objectively.
The experiments (Radil, Wysocki 1996) were performed in the following way: First, detection thresholds were estimated (for amyl acetate resembling the pleasant smell of bananas) by using an ascending concentration, binary (stimulus vs. blank) , forced-choice method. The threshold concentration and five lower, and two higher concentration steps (respectively containing half or double the concentration in comparison with the neighboring stimulus step in the series) were presented always paired with a blank containing the solvent only, each, repetitively, in random order. The task of the subjects was to differentiate whether the first or the second bottle contained the odor. Feedback information was provided on judgement correctness in every trial. Subjects also marked on a continuous scale whether they were certain or guessing. The results revealed that at the threshold concentration, and at two lower concentration steps, the subjects detected the great majority of stimuli correctly, while their statements were mostly based on guessing. Pilot experiments with butyric acid (an unpleasant odor at higher concentrations) showed similar results. The findings pointed to the significance of unconscious olfactory detection of weak stimuli.
Similar experiments (Radil, Pelchat, Wysocki, and Beauchamp 1997) were performed with salty, sweet, sour, and bitter gustatory stimuli, using suitable concentrations of NaCl, sucrose, citric acid, and quinine sulphate. The experimental design was as described above. The results were similar to those obtained with olfactory stimuli. At close to threshold concentrations the subjects detected the great majority of taste stimuli of different modalities correctly, although their statements were mostly based on guessing, and the subjects were not aware of the stimuli.
It follows from both experiments that there exists a certain range of weak stimuli, we call 'liminal, ' which can be correctly detected by guessing, although the subjects are not aware of them. The physiological role of this 'liminal perception' remains unclear. It is worth mentioning that under the conditions adopted, unconscious 'liminal' olfactory, and gustatory detection takes place in normal subjects. We hypothetize that the phenomenon of 'liminal perception' might be a general one, and further experiments are being performed with additional modalities. One can speak in a sense about 'anosmic olfaction' and 'ageusic taste' in the above cases. They may be in a sense analogous to the rare pathogical phenomenon of 'blindsight, ' noted when the primary visual cortex is excluded from the chain of information processing in the visual system. Since there exists, as a rule, a physiological basis for any pathology, it is possible that physiological mechanisms of unconscious detection, acting under normal conditions, could become expressed in blindsight-like cases, when conscious perception brakes down due to specific brain damage. It is quite possible that the hypothetical physiological process of 'liminal visual perception' of weak stimuli, occuring in normal subjects, could be the physiological basis of 'blindsight'. Similar reasoning could contribute to the explanation of other similar pathologies characterized by incomplete and/or dissociated perception in other senses.
03.04-- Abstract No:1072
An anomalous memory finding was reported by Auble, Franks, and Soraci (1979) . Subjects were presented with sentences that were grammatically correct but incomprehensible (e.g., The party stopped because the wire straightened) , and were either given the solution (i.e., "corkscrew") prior to sentence exposure or immediately after exposure. In a free recall test, subjects' retention of the sentences in the delayed-solution condition was superior to that of the sentences for which the solution was presented prior to the sentences, and where the sentences were thus "comprehended" the entire time.
Freud challenged quite a while ago the view of the self-subsisting base of the subject by arguing that self-consciousness already involves temporal discontinuity, differentiation and delay. In effect, temporal delay and "self-withdrawal" facilitate a moment of production in consciousness. Additionally, in Husserl's analysis of "Interval Time Consciousness" he showed that an instant (now- point) arises in and with retention traces so that the pure originary constitution of the present is impossible. Thus, in Husserl as well as in Freud, a form of alterity is constitutive of the presence of consciousness which, in effect, can never be fully articulated nor appropriated because it generates the very moment of the "present" and thus the presence of consciousness.This temporal delay of retention constitutes the opening of the present moment. We will attempt to relate the empirical findings presented above with these notions of consciousness espoused by Freud and Husserl.
03.05-- Abstract No:1131
Two main theories of emotion are widely held today, none of which is true. According to The Cognitive Theory emotions are essentially evaluations. For example, to mourn the death of a beloved friend is to regard the loss of her as evil. It is undeniable that we often evaluate in a completely unemotional way. For example, one may regard a person as morally blameworthy without having any emotion towards her. Hence further restrictions on those evaluations which is to be counted as emotional are necessary: linking them to, say, desires, dispositions to behavior, etc. Suppose that Cognitive Theorists are right, suppose that there is a set of restrictions or conditions which picks out a subclass of evaluations which is extensionally equivalent with the class of emotions. This would make it impossible to argue against the theory by pointing to counter-instances. Does this, as many apparently believe, once and for all settle the question of whether the theory is true in its favour? No. It is introspectively evident that the theory is false: it ignores the affective side of emotions; emotions have a certain 'feel' about them. Jones sees Smith being brutally beaten. This leaves room for widely divergent emotional reactions: Jones may be horrified or feel pity; or – if he is a sadist – he may be delighted. There are evident intrinsic or qualitative differences between these emotions.
What is the affective side? Close at hand is the idea that it is constituted by bodily feelings. An emotion is, according to The Hybrid Theory, a complex of evaluation and bodily feeling, the latter being caused by the former. For example, to be afraid of something is to regard it as threatening and to have bodily sensations caused by this evaluation. But is this notion of affectivity correct? I don't think so. Calm feelings of anger or sorrow doesn't seem to involve any sensations at all; and careful introspection does not unveil a sensational component in the emotion of happiness. Theorists have generally thought that observations such as these give precisely the support needed by the cognitive theory. However, even though remorse, say, does not involve sensations it clearly has some kind of 'feel'.
The Hybrid Theory offers an incorrect account of the affective side. An emotion has an affective side in virtue of a sensation or complex of sensations being causally linked with the intentional act. But the affectivity of emotion seems more intimately related to the intentional act; it is more an aspect or, better, a property of the evaluation. I suggest that we conceive of emotion as an intentional experience with a non-sensory quality, an emotional tone. Happiness, for example, is an intentional act with one kind of emotional tone, sorrow is an intentional act with a different kind of tone. The vast majority of philosopher of emotion seem oblivious of this notion. I hold, however, that the undeniable affectivity of emotion and, more specifically, its non-sensory character makes it indispensable to a true understanding of emotions.
03.05-- Abstract No:1134
It was the purpose of this study to examine the relationship between the practice of Sufism, emotional state and DNA Repair measured through self-report, physiological measures, and a powerful cytogenetic assay. DNA repair systems are largely responsible for preventing tumor formation. A body of evidence suggests that depression and anxiety may influence the course of cancer progression: DNA repair systems may be the mechanisms by which this works.
Spiritual practices such as meditation and prayer are associated with increases in well being and a reduction in stress responsiveness due to a fundamental shift in consciousness. Sufi meditation theorizes that this shift in consciousness is associated with a state of psychological integration and physiological homeostasis referred to as "balance" that long term meditation produces. This is in accord with contemporary research which demonstrates a relaxation response with the practice of focused awareness.
Two groups of women were studied: those with many years of Sufi meditation practice who were also rated as highly balanced, and novice meditators with little experience in Sufi meditation who were rated as imbalanced. DNA Repair systems were analyzed through the number of chromosome anomalies found after x-irradiation exposure. Between group and within group differences were examined for emotional state and DNA Repair efficiency using MANOVA and discriminant function analysis. Results are discussed.
This study provides a broad framework for examining the interaction of emotional state and health systems within humans. An important implication for this research involves the long term treatment of breast cancer.
03.05-- Abstract No:1214
Felt emotions are inherently a virtue of the individual. The domain of felt emotions at the workplace has been researched extensively especially in studies of job satisfaction and job stress. However, some research has proved that experienced and expressed emotions by the individual in the workplace have an impact on the behavior of others. Surprisingly, limited research has been done in attempt to reveal the relationship between emotions and group related behaviors.
Emotions (experienced and expressed) seem to play a predominate role in many group activities and phenomena such as leadership, group commitment and attachment, group identification, cohesion, pro-social and citizenship behaviors, and trust. Up to date, there has been no systematic attempt to integrate all emotional aspects of group behaviors into a unifying framework.
The purpose of this paper is to present a theoretical framework combining the issues of felt emotions and affect to the group level. Specifically, a model in which the role of emotions is a central bonding mechanism of group members one to each othe r is proposed.
A nesting and a multi-dimensional affective group-constructs are proposed as alternative central constructs determining the individuals' group affiliation and group-oriented behavior. A "group mood" model is presented as a unifying model for experie nced and expressed emotions, group dynamics, and coordinated reaction and action.
Finally, research directions are discussed and the expected outcomes of these processes on group related behaviors at the individual level and at the group level are examined.
03.06-- Abstract No:934
David Chalmers distinguishes between the "hard problem" (how it is that we can experience or be aware at all, such as seeing red and feeling pain) and the "easy problems" (the realm of the mind that existing cognitive or neurological research paradigms may uncover) . Since humans and "higher" animals appear to have the ability to experience (hard problem sphere) , this suggests that experimental data showing differences in consciousness between subjects (whether human or "higher" animal) should be describing differences within the so-called easy problem sphere.
The proposed perceptual object model lies within the so-called easy problem sphere. It provides an interpretation of a number of psychological, cognitive and perceptual experiments with humans and higher animals. In particular, the model is based on the perceptual foreground/background experiments of the gestalt psychologists, the object constancy experiments of the Piagetians, and the mental rotation experiments of Shepard and Metzler. The model makes no claim as to what underlying unconscious (out of awareness) cognitive/neurological mechanisms produce these conscious phenomena (a bottom up approach) . Rather, the model is based on experiments with conscious subjects, and so is strictly "top down."
The proposed underlying perceptual mechanism, that produces perceptual objects in the conscious mind, can also, the author hypothesizes, construct other mind phenomena.
1. A word is proposed to be an auditory perceptual object with an associated meaning.
2. A metaphor is proposed to be a new perceptual object that combines the salient aspects of two other perceptual objects. Perceptions of the outside world provide to our mind that which we perceive as "real." A metaphor extends this sense of the "real" onto mind phenomena.
3. The psychosocial sense of self is proposed to be generated when one's person becomes a perceptual object, such as the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror that we share with chimpanzees. The self-object in the foreground of one's mind develops within a background context of other social relations.
4. Thoughts that we are aware of, or at least thoughts as words, are proposed to exist in the "foreground" of the mind, and that any foregrounding requires a "background." In terms of consciousness, the perceptual object model suggests that we have a "mind space" the "virtual background" or "arena of our conscious awareness, " that accompanies the thoughts in the "foreground" of our mind. This is not a physical space, but what in computer jargon would be called a "virtual space." If a word, when spoken, is an auditory perceptual object, then in terms of inner speech, this word remains as a perceptual object in the foreground of a "mind space." This way of viewing thoughts as a mind phenomena in the foreground of the mind suggests that when we awaken and can say that we are conscious, what we are doing is becoming aware of this thought realm, this mind space.
03.06-- Abstract No:1015
Since W. James the metaphor of flow had been applied widely in respect to the consciousness. We suppose the verbal stimuli are particularly important within the flow.
Modern point of view takes an extremely narrow position regarding the activity of mental system in terms of cognitive processing modules. The working memory concept or the situation model concept are the close relatives of consciousness, but they are corresponding primarily with the formal procedures of language processing. The systems of comprehension based on cognitive approach looks like mechanisms with a language determined "bottom- up" operating input and can't grasp the final result of the process. As a rule that family of models functioning have been terminated with changes in semantic network, long term memory or mental model.
Behind the structural transformation of knowledge, the notion of activation is used frequently to cover the fuzziness of facts about the sub-processes that intermediate symbolic activity and other psychological aspects of consciousness.
In our research we studied the impact of texts (oral and written) on hearing person consciousness. We propose the model that considers the verbal stimuli flow as a communication means that could direct, regulate or change the consciousness activity.
The repetition of main phrases on retelling are usual patterns in speech and text. The influence of that patterns on the consciousness were experimentally tested. We expected that the patterns of repetition in texts could produce different effects on consciousness.
One hundred and twenty-three graduate students read five pages passage on an ecology topic arguing against a pollution. Text was presented in four different versions consisting of different rhythmically organized "reverberating" patterns of key phrases. Three measures were taken immediately after the reading session: getting main ideas, the salience of main ideas evaluation and resume writing. Two weeks later were evaluated learning effects: students were tested how they could applying key ideas to new contexts during classroom discussion on the theme of ecology.
Confirming our predictions, we found that the third and the fourth versions produced significantly positive effects on the salience evaluation, and that the first version did not produce any sort of advantages. The learning control session showed that key ideas support depends on the tested patterns.
The results motivate us to make new look at the relationships of language and consciousness.
03.06-- Abstract No:1119
When two people -- you and I, communicate with each other, what is the common information space that allows us to communicate meaningfully? How can I know that I understand you and that you understand me? This will be studied in a simple system by analyzing data from published studies regarding quality: People's reported concepts of 'quality', and sensory perception of food quality/qualities. Two basic mechanisms may be isolated:
1) We share a common, objective physical world which we perceive and communicate subjectively ('the realist view') . Even if you and I talk about a common set of things (physical objects or situations) that we both have encountered, we do not describe them in the same way. We may have perceived these same things differently, so we describe them differently. Or we may have perceived the things in the same way, but use different loadings of the words or different words altogether. 2) We share a common language which we define and use subjectively ('the phenomenologist view') . Even if we use a common set of words in our thoughts and communication, they still do not mean the same to us: We associate the words with different things and we use them differently for different things.
The ideal in case 1) is that we share the experience of a sufficiently complex set of common things. I can then map the patterns of words that you use to describe the things, into the patterns of words that I use to describe the same things. In case 2) the ideal is that we share a sufficiently complex set of words. I can then map the patterns of things that you say that you associate with these words, with the corresponding patterns of things that I associate with the same words.
Each of the two cases will here be studied by the infometric method of Partial Least Squares Regression, PLSR. ('Infometrics' is an increasingly accepted interdisciplinary term for cognitively accessible multivariate data analysis by soft modelling.) The two-block PLSR extracts the main latent structures from one data table X (here: 'my responses') that are statistically stabile and relevant to the corresponding latent structures in another data table Y ('your responses') . In case 1) the things are represented as lines, and the words as columns; in case 2) the words are represented as lines, and the things as columns. The analyses show that although we may use words differently to describe the same set of things, and we associate different things to the same set of words, there may be reliable latent structure in how we differ. Finally, the expansion of this 'me-you' analysis to a 'you-me' and to analysis of various third-person and consensus patterns is discussed.
03.07-- Abstract No:1101
The field of mental imagery has focused mainly on visual and auditory imagery, leaving olfactory imagery untouched. One reason for the neglect of this topic is that olfactory research in general has received less attention than other perceptual processes until recently. According to James, anything that can be sensed is capable of being imaged. However, surveys from the present, and from a century ago, have shown that olfactory is the least reported type of imagery. Some philosophers have assumed that odor imagery does not exist. Instead humans are only capable of having propositional or general knowledge about odors. Past research has failed to explicitly define odor imagery. This failure may lead to confusion about what olfactory imaging actually is, particularly when asking subjects to indicate their imaging ability. According to Hubbard (1997) the essential and defining feature of all categories of images is the perceptual re-experience. Thus, olfactory imaging is defined here as re-smelling an odor in your mind. Current research at the Wheeler Center for Odor Research has focused on how olfactory imaging instructions affect performance on cognitive tasks. Scientists are interested in knowing if imagery includes a perceptual element, or if it contains only propositional information. To test the hypothesis that odor imagery may contain a perceptual element, we decided to see how imagery instructions would affect performance on a perceptual task for odors. The effects of four encoding conditions on odor recognition were compared. The no-imagery condition was designed to prevent any type of imagery by having subjects read serially presented words and count the number of vertical lines in the letters of each word. In the visual imagery condition subjects were asked to read the words, plus attempt to form images of what the named objects looked like. The olfactory imaging condition involved subjects attempting to form olfactory images of the named items, while the actual stimulus condition involved the presentation of odorants with their labels. After encoding, a 5 minute distractor questionnaire consisting of multiple choice questions about imaging abilities was administered. An odor recognition test was then given in which subjects smelled the contents of forty bottles, and were required to decide whether each odor was presented earlier (or related to the presented labels at encoding) . Subjects circled "old" or "new" to indicate their responses. An analysis of variance showed a significant difference between the mean number of hits across conditions. The no-imagery group had the lowest number of mean hits (60%) . Visually imaging yielded an increase in performance (70%) . Odor imagery instructions resulted in a larger increase in mean number of hits (75%) . Having the actual odor produced the highest number of hits (90%) . Olfactory imaging did facilitate recognition in comparison to the no-imaging and visual imaging group. This result provides evidence that olfactory imaging may involve a perceptual re-experience of the odor, which in turn facilitates performance on a perceptual task for odors.
03.07-- Abstract No:1275
Conscious mental imagery is reported in association with waking, dreaming and intermediate states of consciousness. A meta-cognitive theory of consciousness claims that the individual participant may be treated as an imperfect measuring device of his or her own consciousness. This theory is supported by the evidence generated by a research programme on the psychological correlates of imagery vividness using verbal reports from the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973) . Meta-analysis of 150 studies has demonstrated high levels of reliability, content validity and criterion validity (McKelvie, 1995a, b) . This analysis demonstrates that, under controlled conditions, verbal reports provide reliable and valid measures of conscious experience. Activity cycle theory claims that a primary function of consciousness is the mental rehearsal of goal-directed action through the experimental manipulation of perceptual-motor imagery under the control of schemata and environmental cues. As predicted by this theory, the evidence from the meta-analysis shows that the vividness of conscious mental imagery is strongly associated with precisely those performances most likely to benefit from the use of perceptual-motor imagery and mental practice. The implications of these findings for the hard problem of consciousness will be discussed and evaluated.
03.08-- Abstract No:751
Existing computational models of consciousness tend to rush directly into complex neural, physiological thickets (Taylor 1994, Edelman 1989) and thus may lose sight of the forests. Most existing computational models also do not deal adequately with one crucial aspect of human consciousness: learning. In contrast to these approaches, we intend to stay at an intermediate and functional level: investigating the detailed functional roles of consciousness and determining how various aspects of the conscious and the unconscious should figure into the architecture of the mind (in terms of learning as well as performance) . In other words, we posit a middle level between phenomenology and physiology/neurobiology, which might be more apt at capturing fundamental characteristics of consciousness, especially in learning.
As we will focus mainly on the learning aspect in consciousness, we proposed a hybrid two-level learning model CLARION (Sun et al 1996, Sun 1997) to account for the well-established distinction between learning procedural knowledge and declarative knowledge. The crucial link between our model of procedural/declarative knowledge and the conscious/unconscious distinction in humans is in the psychological work on implicit learning (by e.g. Reber 1989, Lewicki 1992, Berry and Broadbent 1988, Stanley et al 1989, Willingham et al 1989) . Such work shows the dissociation between conscious and unconscious learning: Human knowledge, and its acquisition process, could be partially or completely unconscious. The connection from such illustrative data to our model lies in the ability of the model to account for some of the most important characteristics of human implicit/explicit learning as discussed in, for example, Sun (1997) .
The proposed talk will discuss extensive computational simulation by our model of an array of existing as well as new human learning data that exhibit the distinction between implicit and explicit learning processes (in serial reaction time tasks, dynamic control tasks, artificial grammar learning tasks, as well as a navigation task) . Taken together, these simulations demonstrate that our model matches well human conscious and unconscious processes at some level. Furthermore, through simulation, we address the following important question: Why are there two separate (although interacting) systems, one conscious and the other unconscious? Based on our analysis of the literature on implicit learning and existing data, we hypothesize that each system serves a unique function and the two are complementary to each other; that is, there may be a synergy between the conscious and the unconscious. Such a synergy may show up by speeding up learning, improving learned performance, and facilitating transfer of learned skills. Our simulation demonstrated results consistent with this hypothesis. Overall, our modeling and simulation shed new light on the functional roles of the conscious and the unconscious, by clarifying issues concerning the relationships between different (implicit and explicit) cognitive processes (mainly in learning) .
03.08-- Abstract No:815
This paper examines those instances in which an idea or the solution to a problem appears to come to mind from 'out of the blue'. Experiments in which participants are asked to solve puzzles that reliably elicit this phenomenology are reported. Lexical decision and naming tasks following problem solving sessions provide evidence that participants engage in a systematic process of unconscious activation and inhibition of information prior to the sudden conscious realisation of the correct solution.
03.08-- Abstract No:954
The flurry of activity centering around the notion of implicit memory appears to bear the classic hallmarks of a paradigm shift in contemporary memory research and theorizing. In classic sociological and discursive respects, a clear movement has been effected, diverting interest away from the main focus of energy during the 1970s and early eighties, described as "the levels of processing era" (Mitchell, 1991) . However, various issues somewhat metatheoretical in nature, have arrived with this alteration in focus. Close attention will be paid to examples of the reflexive observation language which has attended the newer research program, including the (more reflective) attempts to define and operationalize it's constructs and procedures. This will be undertaken with a view to highlighting two main elements in particular.
Firstly in relation the demand to categorize implicit disclosures as memory, it will be argued that the products of implicit memory - displayed in behavior, yet not framed in conscious workspace - cannot be sensibly be regarded as rememberances in the meaning of the act. It would appear that the "remembering", certainly as a derivative of memory, is obviously non-descript in circumstances of implicitness. With the aid of contrasts between the features of explicit and implicit memory, the term "memory" is now also equated with the (seeming) inadvertent renderings of unconscious processes. Hitherto to this, and for much of cognitive psychology's tenure, bound to the idea of conscious action, or 'recall' and 'recognition' (notwithstanding the associative schemes of the re-emergent connectionism) . To "have a memory" of something was (and in folk theory, still is) just to be capacitated with the ability to reconstruct some past episode, event, or object; or to be able to recognize such items gesturally upon some re-proximity to them.
However, a central characteristic of implicit memory is just the antithesis to this quality. Inferences towards the notion of 'implicit memory' are made on the basis of subtle behavioral indices which denote the influence of past experiences, of which -- in turn -- the individual lacks conscious recourse. As such, these indices reflect the retention of events in the cognitive system of the agent that are then seen to influence subsequent action.
It is on the basis of this account that the author finds it somewhat odd that this concept, as something which directs behavior - and can only be detected as thus - should be termed memory at all. The "detection" of data that support an implicit memory is presupposed by an experimenter's knowledge of a subject's prior exposure to some past instance as a matter of fact. That is, evidence of priming cannot be evidence at all if one cannot identify the object upon which performance was primed. However, it is an anomaly of human memory that a memory can be held for an event that did not occur, and this openness to the false positive does not detract from the status of the memory as a memory. With regards to the consequence of this semantic point, the simple question will be raised as to whether theorists may be appealing to the wrong construct here. Points will then be made on the somewhat out of fashion concept (and psychological sub-division) called, learning - what it may have to offer, and why it may not be invoked.
Secondly the same conceptual exercise will offer analytical demonstration of how conceptual difficulties can also spell conjectural difficulties. The borrowed and grossly expanded use also of the term 'dissociation' (now commonly found in mainstream memory research as it has come to look upon matters of consciousness) , not only begs the question over the appropriate categorization of implicit memory, it propels the subject towards the unparsimonious specter of memory systems (i.e. as an explanation for the implicit/explicit distinction) .
03.08-- Abstract No:968
In this study the use of colour and location as stimulus attributes to be manipulated during a simple action was aimed at comparing how dorsal (location) and ventral (colour) features are integrated in action and the timing of their processing. Eighteen subjects were presented with a green dot on a computer screen that they were required to point and touch. In 20% of the trials, the location or the colour of the target were altered at the onset of movement to this stimulus, requiring the participant to modify the initially programmed response according to specific motor instructions. In the ' location-go » group, the target changed in location and participants were instructed to reach the displaced stimulus by correcting their ongoing movement. In the 'location-stop' and the 'colour-stop' groups, subjects were instructed to interrupt their movement when the target was changed in location or in colour respectively. In the 'color-go' condition, two targets (one green and one red) were used and their colors were interchanged in the case of perturbation. Results showed that the latency of the first responses to the perturbation clearly depended on the stimulus attribute and on the motor response tested: responses to colour change were obtained later than both responses to location change by about 50ms, and the inhibition response to both colour and location was slower than the correction response by about 30ms.
A striking consequence of these temporal asynchronies is that when an attribute of the perturbed target is associated with an inhibition instruction, a correction response can still be observed for movement falling within a particular range of movement time. Another series of experiment used double perturbation sessions in which the target may jump, change its colour, or both (double perturbation of colour and location) . For these double perturbation trials, a stop instruction is associated with the colour change, butundue corrections can be observed for movements of duration ranging from about 200 to 290 ms. This effect is related to the slower processing of inhibition to color as compared to correction to location, but also implies that correction is the default response set in the visuomotor system. Similar automatic corrections were even observed in the 'location-stop' condition, where the target jump can elicit both a correction and an inhibition. Since correction can be processed faster than inhibition, undue forbidden corrections were observed for movement duration between about 200 and 240 ms
It is concluded that implicit on-line motor corrections to a novel target location can be performed against the instruction provided to the subject, because they constitute a default behaviour and they are implemented faster than other responses attached to the change in location. Eventhough the fully explicit nature of the inhibition response can be questioned, it can be assumed that implicit processes can be effective only if they are faster than more explicit ones.
03.08-- Abstract No:969
I will review here evidence from neuropsychological studies as well as psychophysical experiments that specific representation of space are used for immediate actions. I will argue that these short-lived motor representations may be one instance of 'immaculate perception', as defined and denied by Kosslyn and Sussman (1995) . Patients with blindsight (following a lesion of the primary visual area) or numbsense (following a lesion of the primary somatosensory area) can show remarkable ability to perform actions directed toward visual, tactile or proprioceptive stimuli. However, this performance is disrupted when the patient's response is delayed or when s/he has to build up a semantic representation of the stimulus (e.g. verbalization) . In the same way, the frame of reference used by normal subjects to perform an action toward a visual or a proprioceptive target can vary with experimental conditions. Targets seem to be encoded in an egocentric frame of reference when the target pointing is immediate, whereas they seem to be encoded in the extrapersonal space when the pointing is delayed. The same effect was observed when subjects were required to verbalize a target attribute relevant to the action (location) , but not another attribute (texture) . These results suggest that a residual sensory system is able to build up a presentation of space devoted to action. This representation would be short-lived, and higher representations (such as semantic) would take over after a short delay (see also Castiello et al. 1991) . Consistently, it is to be noticed that driving an action toward a goal implies this goal is not re-presented in the brain but rather realistically presented in a way that coincides with the external world, so as not to miss the goal. I argue that this category of space 'representation', that is a real 'presentation' of spatial information relevant to action and can be disconnected from higher-level representations, constitutes a kind of 'immaculate' perception.
References:
Castiello U. Temporal dissociation of motor responses and subjective awareness. A study in normal subjects. Brain 1991;114:2639-2655.
Kosslyn SM, Sussman AL: Roles of imagery in perception : or, there is no such thing as immaculate perception; in Gazzaniga, (ed) : The cognitive neurosciences. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1995, pp 1035-1042.
Perenin M-T, Rossetti Y. Grasping in an hemianopic field. Another instance of dissociation between perception and action. Neuroreport 1996;7:793-797.
Rossetti Y, Rode G, Boisson D. Implicit processing of somaesthetic information : a dissociation between where and how ? Neuroreport 1995;6:506-510.
Rossetti Y: Implicit perception in action: short lived motor representations of space; in Grossenbacher, (ed) : Finding consciousness in the brain. Benjamin Publ., 1997, in press.
Rossetti Y, Régnier C: Representations in action : pointing to a target with various representations; in Bardy, Bootsma, and Guiard (eds) : Studies in Perception and Action III. Mahwah, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, 1995, pp 233-236.
03.08-- Abstract No:1047
Many studies of implicit memory have shown that priming persists even in the absence of attention to, or awareness of, the experimental stimuli. Phenomenal experience of stimuli is not necessary for those stimuli to prime subsequent performance. However, anesthesia research suggests that other aspects of consciousness may be necessary for implicit memory formation. Studies of hypesthesia, in which volunteers receive sub-clinical doses of anesthetics, have shown that explicit and implicit memory formation are abolished by anesthetic doses low enough to preserve auditory perception and short-term memory function (Andrade, 1996) . In contrast, however, there are many clinical studies that demonstrate memory for stimuli presented during surgery under general anesthesia. This preserved memory may be evidence for implicit learning but it is not conclusive because almost none of the relevant studies included an on-line measure of depth of anesthesia. Many of the patients tested were paralysed during surgery, a state that aids the surgeon but makes it hard for the anesthesiologist to detect changes in depth of anesthesia. It remains possible, therefore, that the remembered stimuli were encoded during moments of light anesthesia or awareness (Andrade, 1995) and hence that the learning was explicit rather than implicit. Alternatively, the psychological or physiological stresses induced by surgery may increase the probability of learning, even in the absence of awareness of the stimuli. This paper reports current research exploring the factors that influence learning during anesthesia. This research compares surgical patients' memory for auditory stimuli presented during sedation, with their memory for stimuli presented during general anesthesia with or without surgical stimulation. Electrophysiological measures of depth of anesthesia are combined with laboratory techniques for assessing the contributions of explicit and implicit memory to performance on memory tests, for example the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993) and Reingold and Merikle's (1988) method of matching direct and indirect memory tests for sensitivity. These studies will reveal whether learning during anesthesia is implicit and whether the amount learned varies with depth of anesthesia and degree of surgical stimulation.
References:
Andrade, J. (1995) Learning during anaesthesia: A review. British Journal of Psychology, 86 (4) , 479-506.
Andrade, J. (1996) Investigations of hypesthesia: Using anesthetics to explore relationships between consciousness, learning, and memory. Consciousness and Cognition, 5, 562-580.
Jacoby, L. L., Toth, J. P., & Yonelinas, A. P. (1993) Separating conscious and unconscious influences of memory: Measuring recollection. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 122, 139-154.
Reingold, E. M. & Merikle, P. M. (1988) Using direct and indirect measures to study perception without awareness. Perception and psychophysics, 44, 563-575.
03.08-- Abstract No:1089
Present behavior is often influenced by past experience. Sometimes people are unaware of the influence, and sometimes they may even be unaware of the experience itself as it unfolds. Thus, for instance, the influence of subliminally or implicitly perceived material has been shown to affect subsequent behaviors such as personality judgments or problem solving. We are interested here in the ways in which implicitly earned aspects of a complex pattern of stimuli, particularly, contextual contingencies between a target and its surround, influence the explicit remembering of other aspects of the same pattern of information. Reinstatement of the same context often gives people a chance of acting upon the world under the influence of information that they picked up without awareness. This is true for memory, inasmuch as people often find it easier to remember a previously studied item in the context in which they originally studied it than in a different context. Our question is: Must people be aware that a contingency context during study in order for a context effect to emerge? In other words, can one find a context effect when the context is implicitly learned as well as when it is explicitly learned?
Ninety-six subjects were randomly assigned to a "one-day, ""four-day, " or "one-week" delay condition. The 96 stimulus words consisted of six exemplars of four semantic categories selected from Battig and Montague (1969) and 72 semantically unrelated words. During the study phase, each word appeared on a computer screen for five seconds, followed by a blank screen for five seconds. Six category words and 12 semantically unrelated words appeared individually in the middle of each quadrant of the computer screen. Each category was uniquely associated with a particular position. For instance, exemplars of animals always appeared in the upper right-hand quadrant, whereas exemplars of professions always appeared in the lower left-hand quadrant.
During the recognition test, 48 "old" words and 48 "new" words appeared on the computer screen. The distractors included 6 words from each of the four semantic categories and 24 semantically unrelated words remaining in the original set of 72. Half the target words and category distractors appeared in the originally assigned quadrants ("in-position") whereas the other half of the targets and category distractors were randomly assigned to the "category-inconsistent" quadrants ("out-of-position) . Testing occurred one day, three days, or one week after study.
We were chiefly concerned about the presence of a position effects or the recognition of semantically consistent targets and distractors. Sixty-eight of the subjects denied any knowledge of the contextual contingency during the debriefing session. We analyzed the data for thegroup overall and then completed an analysis for this "implicit" subsample. For the "overall" sample, we found a significant main effect for position, with both more hits and more false alarms occurring when the recognition probe was in-position than when it was out-of-position. The "implicit" subsample showed the same pattern of results.
These results indicate that even when people are unaware of learning or remembering a contextual contingency, the reinstated context can nevertheless facilitate recognition. Contextual contingencies can contribute to recognition even when people are not consciously aware of the contingencies or are consciously using the contingency to make or justify a recognition judgment.
03.08-- Abstract No:1179
A women presented with a left hemiplegia following a right haemorrhage. Clinical examination also revealed a left hemianopia, a left hemianesthesia and a strong left unilateral neglect, with a full anosognosia of all these unilateral deficits. She was acknowledging that "something has changed" and that she was "not the same as previously", but always attributed these changes to her clumsiness or laziness, overwhelmed herself with many other pejorative adjectives. In no occasion she concealed that something was wrong about her left body, and, when further questioned, vehemently denied to be hemiplegic. On many occasions she took her left hand in her right hand and shaken it to demonstrate it could move, commenting on her weak volition.
When specifically asked whether she could perform a list of sensori-motor task, like walking, putting socks on, peal an apple, switching on the light, pulling a drawer, she answered positively, and spontaneously reported she would perform in every task as well as before entering the hospital. However, when the patient was asked to rate herself for the same list of sensori-motor tasks, significantly lower notes were observed for bimanual items than for monomanual items.
In the somatosensory domain, she was reporting touch sensation on her left arm only when tested with eyes open. No feeling of touch could be reported when blindfolded. However, she grimaced when gently pinched on the arm.
We will argue from these examples that they reflect interactions between implicit and explicit processing.
03.08-- Abstract No:1265
The altered state of awareness induced by general anesthesia provides an interesting area in which to explore unconscious cognition. Surgical patients who have been administered general anesthesia are not supposed to be aware of events during anesthesia, and they are not supposed to have any post-surgical memory for events that occurred during anesthesia. Indeed, anesthesiologists try to administer just the right mixture and dose of chemicals so that their patients experience no pain, no awareness, and no memory.
However, for more than 30 years, there have been reports of findings which suggest that surgical patients both perceive and remember specific events occurring during general anesthesia. These findings have been difficult to interpret because there have been almost as many studies suggesting that surgical patients do NOT perceive and remember information presented during anesthesia. It is possible that what appear to be inconsistent patterns of findings across individual studies may actually reflect more consistent patterns of findings when the results of the individual studies are combined and the overall patterns of findings across studies are established. For this reason, we conducted a meta-analysis of all studies investigating memory for events during anesthesia. The meta-analysis was designed to answer the following questions: (1) Do positive suggestions during general anesthesia reduce either the number of postoperative days in hospital or the need for postoperative analgesics? (2) Is memory for specific information presented during anesthesia revealed by either direct (explicit) or indirect (implicit) tests of memory administered following recovery from anesthesia?
The results of the meta-analysis reveal the conditions under which there is memory for positive suggestions and specific information presented during anesthesia. These results are considered in light of recent findings evaluating the relation between the depth of surgical anesthesia and subsequent memory for events during anesthesia.
03.08-- Abstract No:1284
A new technique for producing subliminal effects with visual masking provides a diagnostic for unconscious analysis of visual information. (The method will be demonstrated in this talk.) If it is assumed that conscious and unconscious cognition exhaust the possible modes for processing visual stimuli, then a demonstration that some processing cannot be achieved unconsciously demands the conclusion that it requires conscious cognition. Use of the subliminal procedure to test basic linguistic discriminations revealed that unconscious cognition can distinguish (a) singular from plural nouns when the plurals are formed regularly (by adding -s or -es to the noun's singular form), and (b) present from past verb tense (when the past was formed regularly by adding -ed to the present verb form). However, unconscious cognition was not capable of distinguishing (a) singular from plural when the plural form was irregular (e.g., goose v. geese), (b) present from irregular past tense (e.g., do v. did), or (c) grammatical from nongrammatical irregular conjugations (e.g., he does v. they am). Difficulty of reconciling these findings with the widespread assumption that all of these simple linguistic feats are accomplished unconsciously calls into question the initial assumption of only two possible modes (conscious and unconscious) of processing. They also suggest the provocative hypothesis that irregular grammatical forms may have evolved because they oblige more effortful (i.e., conscious) processing.
03.09-- Abstract No:861
Freud's theories of mind continues to be a highly controversial matter [1]. They create an almost inmediately attraction/rejection reaction. Few bridges has been built between cognitive sciences and Freud's theorethical hypothesis [2]. But in this context of increased interest on the nature of consciousness, it might be fruitful to gaze upon his insights again.
This is an attempt to provide an actualised formulation on Freud's statements on consciousness, to relate them with new ideas in science and to explore its epistemological consequences.
Their hypothesis on consciousness are spread all over his writtings. He thought about it for more than fifty years, because as himself once said : 'No complete psychology could exist, if it does not attemp to resolve or give any kind of answer to the problem of consciousness' [3].
It is possible to distinguish three main areas where Freud's ideas on consciousness trigger: neurophysiological, psychological and epistemological.
Three words are closely related with his insights: perception, language and qualities (qualia) . He tries to study conscious processes using two dimensions, psychological and neurophysiological, because he, in his theorethic papers, wants to provide an answer to the general question about what a mind is, how it works and how such kind of mind could emerge from a body (soma) .
In his earliest papers, Freud makes an effort to foundate psychological facts in terms of neurophysiological ones. So consciousness is seen as the 'output' of a special kind of processes performed by a particular neuronal system and this 'output' is made of 'psychic qualities'. In regard of their origin, these qualities can be seen as endogenous ( if they come from soma) or exogenous (outer world) . The body provides drives and pain ; outer world sensorial inputs. Endogenous stimuli are seen as tension/release states in neurophysiological terms and as displeasure/pleasure states in psychological ones.
Psychologically spoken, consciousness is defined as 'a sensorial organ for reception of psychic qualities' [4]. It arises related with two psychological functions: perception and language ; so two types of consciousness appear. One, primordial and inmediate, related to sensorial inputs ; the other, later and mediate, comes through sounding images of spoken words [5].
Dreams' study contributes with new insights: consciousness is present but in an altered, different state. He studies dream formation processes, how conscioussnes arises on them and concludes that as it provides qualities rather during sleep than vigil life, consciousness is not related uniquely to the ego but with a wide range of psychic processes. Consciousness is not equal to the ego and is also plural : there are differents states of it. In exchange energy terms, consciousness is produced by an overcathexis mechanism, that explain psychological phenomenon of attention.
In his latest papers, Freud remarks close interaction between perception and consciousness designing them as a psychic system: the perception-consciousness system (Pp-C system) , the surface of the psyche, the most exterior of all psychic systems, the nearest of outer world. Two influences are prior for constructing the ego: the first one, from Pp-c system that presents outer world to the psyche and in second place, the body. The ego's nucleous grows like an extension of this surface apparatus.
Epistemological consequences of his ideas includes references to reality, space and time nature. Consciousness' possibility derives from interaction with outer world and is seen as a biological advantage. Pp-C system is the principal tool to find objects in order to satisfy vital needs and this important function gives its outstanding psychological status and biological (adaptative) profit. Freud states that outer space derives from psychic one by projection mechanism: Pp-C system has the key role to introduce reality proof and confront it with psychic reality. Finally, the nature of consciousness processes -- Freud speculates -- gives time its discountinous aspect: conscioussnes is an on/off emergent state because Pp-C system works in an intermittent manner, so 'time' reflects this periodic pattern [6].
References
[1] 'Why Freud Isn't Dead', Scientific American, December 1996, pp. 74-79.
[2] Pribram, Karl & Gill, Merton (1976) , Freud's 'Project' Reassessed, (London:Hutchinson & Co.)
[3] Freud, S. (1895) , Project for a Scientific Psychology, Standard Edition, vol.1 (1966) , pp.281-297.
[4] Freud, S. (1900) , The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Edition, vol 4-5.
[5] Freud, S. (1915) , The Unconscious, Standard Edition, vol.14 (1957) , pp.159-215.
[6] Freud, S. (1924) , Notiz über den 'Wunderblock', Studienausgabe, 3, pp.363-9.
03.09-- Abstract No:937
When nonhuman animals behave in ways that suggest they are thinking consciously, many behavioral scientists hold that it is more parsimonious to assume that the animal has been conditioned to perform the behavior in question. They use the word "conditioned" as a pejorative, assuming that conditioning is a form of primitive learning that, as such, does not require consciousness.
But a growing body of evidence supports the idea that classical conditioning occurs in humans only when the subject is conscious of the relationship between the stimuli. This statement holds, except in the case of biologically-prepared aversive stimuli, whether assessed by verbal report, behavior, or autonomic response. Shanks & St. John concluded in their review article (1994) , "Since many researchers regard conditioning as representing a relatively primitive learning system...it is plausible to imagine that learning without awareness can occur in this context. The conclusion from a huge number of studies, however, is quite the opposite: there is no compelling evidence for conditioning in human subjects without awareness of the reinforcement contingency." Baars wrote in agreement (1997a) ". . . in order to learn something, we have to pay attention to it. But of course, 'paying attention' means that we stay conscious of something." He added (1997b) "The ability to combine two separate pieces of information has never been shown for unconscious input . . . even in implicit learning we must be conscious of the material from which we derive the unconscious pattern."
At the same time, a refinement of technique in both human and nonhuman animal experiments has led to a convergence in classical conditioning methodology. In human experiments, Hamm & Vaitl (1996) determined that skin conductance measures, as opposed to eye blink and heart rate, correlate strongly with verbal report. And Arcediano et al. (1996) suggested that verbal report itself could be eliminated since it " . . . reflected the same pattern of results as the behavioural data . . ." In animal experiments, Miller & Matute (1996) found that similar phenomena "could be obtained in animals if they were treated analogously to human subjects, " by not using biologically-prepared aversive stimuli. The unmistakable conclusion is that the more similar the experimental design, the more similar the results for human and nonhuman animals alike.
Taken together, these lines of evidence strongly suggest that classical conditioning in humans and nonhuman animals is one and the same process. Since conditioning occurs in humans only when the subjects are conscious of the contingency, then the clear implication is that when similar conditioning occurs in animals, they too are conscious.
Bibliography
Arcediano, Francisco, Nuria Ortega, & Helena Matute (1996) A behavioural preparation for the study of human Pavlovian conditioning. Quarterly J. of experimental psychology 49B (3) :270-83.
Baars, Bernard (1997a) In the theatre of consciousness: The workspace of the mind. N.Y.:Oxford U. Press.
Baars, Bernard (1997b) In the theatre of consciousness: Global workspace theory, a rigorous scientific theory of consciousness. J. of consciousness studies 4 (4) :292-309.
Hamm, Alfons O. & Dieter Vaitl (1996) Affective learning: awareness and aversion. Psychophysiology 33:698-710.
Miller, Ralph R. & Helena Matute (1996) Biological significance in forward and backward blocking; Resolution of a discrepancy between animal conditioning and human causal judgment. J. of experimental psychology: general 123 (4) :370-86.
Shanks, David R. & Mark F. St. John (1994) Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems. Behavioral & brain sciences 17:367-447.
03.09-- Abstract No:967
Today, the majority of the models in psychology are based on unconscious mechanisms. These mechanisms are so well accepted that only few research studies challenge them. This work attempts to unravel the basic assumptions that underlie the notion of the unconscious, to question their status and to suggest possible conscious replacements.
Unconscious mechanisms are composed of unconscious structures, unconscious processes, unconscious rules, unconscious contents and sometimes unconscious energy. These constituents are considered to be unconscious because people show no subjective knowledge (by introspection) of them. On the other hand, people may be ignorant of them simply because they do not exist inside their mind.
I argue that structures, processes, rules, contents and other constituents of what is considered to be the unconscious mechanisms of the mind are, in fact, tools of the consciousness of the psychologist. These tools belong to the background of the psychologist's consciousness. They were created in order to make the psychological world organized and intelligible. When a psychologist tries to explain psychological phenomenon his consciousness is that of a subject vis a vis an external psychological object. In this state of consciousness, the subject is totally immersed in the object and falsely projects the background tools of consciousness onto the psychological object, while being totally blind to the contribution of himself to the interpretation of the psychological phenomenon. Thus, people are not ignorant of the operation of mechanisms in themselves but rather of the projection of the psychologist's tools of consciousness onto them.
Consciousness can be a substitute for the unconscious mechanisms in explaining general psychological phenomena (memory, perception, emotion, etc.) as well as specific psychological phenomena that are considered to be unconscious (implicit memory, implicit learning, subliminal perception, etc.) . What researchers usually consider to be consciousness is only one state of consciousness. I will call it the prototypical consciousness. Its main characteristics are the differentiation of subject and object, focal attention, separation between figure and ground, verbalization, volition and moderate flowing of time. A psychological phenomenon that does not fall under some or all of these categories is usually considered to be unconscious. However, it could be described as occurring in another state of consciousness. Automatic processes, for example are considered to be unconscious, mainly because the performer cannot describe them. However, it is possible that automatic performances occur so quickly and inattentively that "no memory of them remains" as William James argued. In addition, when doing something automatically, the separation between subject and object becomes blurred. In driving, for example, the body of the car becomes a continuation and extension of the driver's hands. Thus, automatic processes could be seen as happening in a state of consciousness that is rapid, not focally attentive and that does not separate between subject and object.
A wide range of psychological phenomena could be explained by creating a typology of different states of consciousness and describing the interplay between them.
03.09-- Abstract No:982
Nonconscious perception can be demonstrated by the indirect effect of nonconsciously presented (e.g. visually masked) stimuli on intentional responses to other stimuli. A few studies also report non-chance performance when responses are made "directly" to stimuli of which subjects are subjectively unaware. The characteristics of such "direct" responding are further explored in an experiment which measures forced-choice semantic categorisation of masked words when subjects are, by self report, subjectively unaware of the words. This experiment adopts a novel approach to the problem of validating subjective measures of awareness, relying on the relationship between forced-choice performance and a battery of detailed introspective ratings. I argue that this approach is not only viable but extremely informative. It yields qualitative data that reveals interesting gradations in the way that information from masked stimuli becomes manifest in consciousness, and forces a more sophisticated definition of stimulus awareness. Introspective ratings also show the "passivity" of responding to be an important performance variable, not merely between subjects as has already been found, but within subjects, influencing the shape of psychophysical functions which in turn guide theories of masking. More generally, the experiment reminds us that subjective operational definitions of consciousness can be important if we are to distinguish conscious from nonconscious processing. Current explanations of the effect of passivity on both direct and indirect measures of stimulus processing are shown to be inadequate, but raise interesting issues regarding the complex interaction between nonconscious processes and "attentional" strategies that can be consciously modulated.
03.09-- Abstract No:1128
Research exploring the processes activated by conscious contemplation of death has shown that the initial responses are ones that serve conscious concerns: to convince oneself that death is far off (e.g., by denying attributes associated with a short life expectancy) and to remove death-related thoughts from consciousness by suppressing them. Thus, immediately after a mortality salience (MS) treatment, the accessibility of death-related thought is low, unless subjects are under high cognitive load, which has been shown to disrupt suppression. After a delay, the accessibility of death-related thought increases, triggering increased defense of one's worldview. Once the worldview is defended, the accessibility of such thoughts reduces to pre-MS levels. The assumption is that the delayed response to MS, increased worldview defense, serves the unconscious need to minimize the potential for existential terror. Bolstering of the worldview does not rationally address the problem of death, but strengthens the extent to which the individual is embedded in his or her own benign culturally derived conception of reality. Indeed, when people contemplate death in a rational, analytic way, these effects don't occur; when they contemplate death in an experiential intuitive way, they do. To definitively support the point that the concern that motivates worldview defense is an unconscious one, we have recently shown in three studies that presenting death-related words below the subjective threshold of awareness also motivates increased worldview defense. Thus, these effects occur even when subjects have no awareness that they were exposed to a death-related stimulus. The overall pattern of findings suggests that death is defended in both direct ways that serve conscious concerns and in symbolic ways that serve unconscious concerns.
03.09-- Abstract No:1129