Journal
of Consciousness Studies One of the reasons for the current explosion of interest in the study of consciousness has been the development of new technologies for the study of the brain. This has given rise to a widespread optimism within the neuroscience community that a theory of consciousness could be just around the corner.
However many commentators have pointed out that although there has been undoubted progress in the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, there is still an "explanatory gap." What sort of theory would it take to bridge the gap between brain processes and phenomenal experience?
Philosopher David Chalmers gave eloquent expression to this at the first Tucson conference, when he drew a distinction between the "easy problems" (cognitive functions like discrimination and the focus of attention) and the "hard problem" (why should any of this be accompanied by phenomenal experience?).
The Journal of Consciousness Studies is publishing a three-part special issue in which authors are invited to address this "hard problem". The first two issues are now available, and contain the following articles:
Additional Hard Problem articles appear in Issue 3, No.3, Issue 3, No.4, Issue 3, No.5/6
Chalmers' response appears in Issue 4, No.1
Full text for the Chalmers keynote paper is available and, for North American browsers, we also include a link to the US connection.
But it's a long paper, and who wants to sit in front of a computer all day anyway? So we have printed an extra 1000 copies of these two issues which we are making available at the special price of $US 8.50 (UK 5 pounds) each. The price includes accelerated delivery for US, UK and Europe, surface elsewhere (airmail extra $2.50 (UKP 1.50).
Or take out a subscription for the current year (Vol.4, 1997) and we will send you the original special issue (containing David Chalmers' keynote article and six commentaries) free of charge.
If you would like to order these, then just email sandra@imprint.co.uk and we'll also send you a 16 page colour brochure on other consciousness publications and conferences along with a 40 page offprint booklet of the exchange between Grush/Churchland and Penrose/Hameroff on quantum theories of mind.
The "hard problem" is a major topic on the jcs-online email discussion list. To participate or listen in on this discussion just send an email to majordomo@lists.zynet.co.uk saying:
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There is no charge for participating in this discussion group.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 200-19
David J. Chalmers,
Department of Philosophy,
University of California
Santa Cruz, CA 95064,
USA.
Email: chalmers@ling.ucsc.edu
Abstract:
Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the
mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience,
but there is nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of mental phenomena
have yielded to scientific investigation in recent years, but consciousness
has stubbornly resisted. Many have tried to explain it, but the explanations
always seem to fall short of the target. Some have been led to suppose
that the problem is intractable, and that no good explanation can be given.
To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that these methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the door to further progress is opened. In the second half of the paper, I argue that if we move to a new kind of nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given. I put forward my own candidate for such an account: a nonreductive theory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance and a double-aspect view of information.
The full text is available.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 241-55
Thomas W. Clark,
7 Partridge Ave.,
Somerville, MA 02143,
USA.
Email: twc@world.std.com
Abstract:
This paper critiques the view that consciousness is likely something
extra which accompanies or is produced by neural states, something beyond
the functional cognitive processes realized in the brain. Such a view creates
the `explanatory gap' between function and phenomenology which many suppose
cannot be filled by functionalist theories of mind. Given methodological
considerations of simplicity, ontological parsimony, and theoretical conservatism,
an alternative hypothesis is recommended, that subjective qualitative experience
is identical to certain information-bearing, behaviour-controlling functions,
not something which emerges from them. This hypothesis explains the isomorphism
between the structure of experience and neural organization, while providing
a naturalistic account of qualia as relational properties of informational
states, not a separate ontology of phenomenal essences. On this functionalist
view, the hard, empirical problem of consciousness is to discover precisely
which neural functions constitute subjective experience.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 231-40
C.J.S. Clarke,
University of Southampton,
Faculty of Mathematical Studies,
Highfield,
Southampton SO17 1BJ,
UK.
Email: cjsc@maths.soton.ac.uk
Abstract:
The dominance in normal awareness of visual percepts, which are linked
to space, obscures the fact that most thoughts are non-spatial. It is argued
that the mind is intrinsically non-spatial, though in perception can become
compresent with spatial things derived from outside the mind. The assumption
that the brain is entirely spatial is also challenged, on the grounds that
there is a perfectly good place for the non-spatial in physics. A quantum
logic approach to physics, which takes non-locality as its starting point,
offers a non-reductive way of reconciling the experience of mind with the
world description of physics. For further progress it is necessary to place
mind first as the key aspect of the universe.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 266-71
E.J. Lowe,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Durham,
Durham, UK.
Email: E.J.Lowe@durham.ac.uk
Abstract:
This paper challenges David Chalmers' proposed division of the problems
of consciousness into the `easy' ones and the `hard' one, the former allegedly
being susceptible to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms
and the latter supposedly turning on the fact that experiential `qualia'
resist any sort of functional definition. Such a division, it is argued,
rests upon a misrepresention of the nature of human cognition and experience
and their intimate interrelationship, thereby neglecting a vitally important
insight of Kant. From a Kantian perspective, our capacity for conceptual
thought is so inextricably bound up with our capacity for phenomenal consciousness
that it is an illusion to imagine that there are any `easy' problems
of consciousness, resolvable within the computational or neural paradigms.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 220-30
Colin McGinn,
Dept. of Philosophy,
Rutgers University,
P.O. Box 270,
New Brunswick,
NJ 08903-0270,
USA.
Abstract:
Consciousness lacks extension and other spatial properties. But how
can this be, if it arises from matter in space? The paper argues that this
conundrum can only be solved by recognizing that our current conception
of space is fundamentally inadequate. However, no other conception is available
to us.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 272-88
William Seager,
University of Toronto,
1265 Military Trail,
Scarborough,
Ontario M1C 1A4,
Canada.
Email: seager@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
Abstract:
The generation problem is to explain how material configurations or
processes can produce conscious experience. David Chalmers urges that this
is what makes the problem of consciousness really difficult. He proposes
to side-step the generation problem by proposing that consciousness is
an absolutely fundamental feature of the world. I am inclined to agree
that the generation problem is real and believe that taking consciousness
to be fundamental is promising. But I take issue with Chalmers about what
it is to be a fundamental feature of the world. In fact, I argue that taking
the idea seriously ought to lead to some form of panpsychism. Powerful
objections have been advanced against panpsychism, but I attempt to outline
a form of the doctrine which can evade them. In the end, I suspect that
we will face a choice between panpsychism and rethinking the legitimacy
of the generation problem itself.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 255-65
Max Velmans,
Department of Psychology,
Goldsmiths, University of London,
New Cross,
London, SE14 6NW,
England.
Email: mlv@gold.ac.uk
Abstract:
Within psychology and the brain sciences, the study of consciousness
and its relation to human information processing is once more a focus for
productive research. However, some ancient puzzles about the nature of
consciousness appear to be resistant to current empirical investigations,
suggesting the need for a fundamentally different approach. In Velmans
(1991a; b; 1993a) I have argued that functional (information processing)
accounts of the mind do not `contain' consciousness within their workings.
Investigations of information processing are not investigations of consciousness
as such. Given this, first-person investigations of experience need to
be related nonreductively to third-person investigations of processing.
For example, conscious contents may be related to neural/physical representations
via a dual-aspect theory of information. Chalmers (1995) arrives at similar
conclusions. But there are also theoretical differences. Unlike Chalmers
I argue for the use of neutral information processing language for functional
accounts rather than the term `awareness'. I do not agree that functional
equivalence cannot be extricated from phenomenal equivalence, and suggest
a hypothetical experiment for doing so - using a cortical implant for blindsight.
I argue that not all information has phenomenal accompaniments, and introduce
a different form of dual-aspect theory involving `psychological complementarity'.
I also suggest that the hard problem posed by `qualia' has its origin in
a misdescription of everyday experience implicit in dualism.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.4-6
Daniel C. Dennett
Center for Cognitive Studies,
Tufts University,
Medford,
MA 02155,
USA.
Abstract:
The strategy of divide and conquer is usually an excellent one, but
it all depends on how you do the carving. Chalmer's (1995) attempt to sort
the `easy' problems of consciousness from the `really hard' problem is
not, I think, a useful contribution to research, but a major misdirector
of attention, an illusion-generator. How could this be? Let me describe
two somewhat similar strategic proposals, and compare them to Chalmers'
recommendation.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.7-13
Valerie Gray Hardcastle
Department of Philosophy,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
Blacksburg,
Virginia 24061–0126,
USA.
Abstract:
In this essay, I hope to make clearer what the points of division between
the materialists and the sceptics are. I argue that the rifts are quite
deep and turn on basic differences in understanding the scientific enterprise.
In section I, I outline the disagreements between David Chalmers and me,
arguing that consciousness is not a brute fact about the world. In section
II, I point out the fundamental difference between the materialists and
the sceptics, suggesting that this difference is not something that further
discussion or argumentation can overcome. In the final section, I outline
one view of scientific explanation and conclude that the source of conflict
really turns on a difference in the rules each side has adopted in playing
the game.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.14-25
William S. Robinson
Department of Philosophy,
Iowa State University,
Ames,
IA 50011,
USA.
Email: wsrob@iastate.edu
Abstract:
This paper offers an account of why the Hard Problem cannot be solved
within our present conceptual framework. The reason is that some property
of each conscious experience lacks structure, while explanations of the
kind that would overcome the Hard Problem require structure in the occurrences
that are to be explained. This account is apt to seem incorrect for reasons
that trace to relational theories of consciousness. I thus review a highly
developed representative version of relational theory (namely, David Rosenthal's,
1986; 1990) and explain why I do not find it acceptable. This rejection
requires a nonrelational alternative, which I describe and defend against
a certain further objection. Finally, I discuss implications of the foregoing
for the views of McGinn (1991) and Chalmers (1995).
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.26-32
Eugene Mills
Div. of Philosophy,
Virginia Commonwealth University,
915 West Franklin Street,
Richmond,
VA 23284-2025,
USA.
Email: eomills@gems.vcu.edu
Abstract:
David Chalmers (1995) calls the problem of explaining why physical
processes give rise to conscious phenomenal experience the `hard problem'
of consciousness. He argues convincingly that no reductive account of consciousness
can solve it and offers instead a non-reductive account which takes consciousness
as fundamental. This paper argues that a theory of the sort Chalmers proposes
cannot hope to solve the hard problem of consciousness precisely because
it takes the relation between physical processes and consciousness as fundamental
rather than explicable. The hard problem of consciousness is, for reasons
Chalmers himself gives, insoluble. Its insolubility does not, however,
impugn the naturalistic respectability of consciousness.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.33-35
Benjamin Libet
Department of Physiology,
University of California, San Francisco,
CA 94143-0444,
USA.
Abstract:
Solutions to the `hard problem' of consciousness must accept conscious
experience as a fundamental non-reducible phenomenon in nature, as Chalmers
suggests. Chalmers proposes candidates for an acceptable theory, but I
find basic flaws in these. Our own experimental investigations of brain
processes causally involved in the development of conscious experience
appear to meet Chalmers' requirement. Even more directly, I had previously
proposed a hypothetical `conscious mental field' as an emergent property
of appropriate neural activities, with the attributes of integrated subjective
experience and a causal ability to modulate some neural processes. This
theory meets all the requirements imposed by the `hard problem' and, significantly,
it is experimentally testable.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.36-53
Stuart Hameroff
Departments of Anesthesiology and Psychology,
University of Arizona,
Tucson,
Arizona,
USA.
Roger Penrose
Mathematical Institute,
University of Oxford,
24–29 St. Giles,
Oxford OX1 3LB,
UK.
Abstract:
What is consciousness? Some philosophers have contended that
`qualia', or an experiential medium from which consciousness is derived,
exists as a fundamental component of reality. Whitehead, for example, described
the universe as being comprised of `occasions of experience'. To examine
this possibility scientifically, the very nature of physical reality must
be re-examined. We must come to terms with the physics of space–time —
as is described by Einstein's general theory of relativity — and its relation
to the fundamental theory of matter — as described by quantum theory. This
leads us to employ a new physics of objective reduction: OR
which appeals to a form of `quantum gravity' to provide a useful description
of fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline (Penrose,
1994; 1996). Within the OR scheme, we consider that consciousness
occurs if an appropriately organized system is able to develop and maintain
quantum coherent superposition until a specific `objective' criterion (a
threshold related to quantum gravity) is reached; the coherent system then
self-reduces (objective reduction: OR). We contend that this type
of objective self-collapse introduces non-computability, an essential feature
of consciousness. OR is taken as an instantaneous event — the climax
of a self-organizing process in fundamental space–time — and a candidate
for a conscious Whitehead-like `occasion' of experience. How could an OR
process occur in the brain, be coupled to neural activities, and account
for other features of consciousness? We nominate an OR process with
the requisite characteristics to be occurring in cytoskeletal microtubules
within the brain's neurons (Penrose and Hameroff, 1995; Hameroff and Penrose,
1995; 1996).
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.54-68
Jonathan Shear
Dept. of Philosophy,
Virginia Commonwealth University,
Richmond,
VA 23284–2025,
USA.
Email: jcs@richmond.infi.net
Abstract:
It stands to reason that full understanding of what is involved in
the `hard problem' will emerge only on the basis of systematic scientific
investigation of the subjective phenomena of consciousness, as well as
the objective phenomena of matter. Yet the idea of such a systematic scientific
investigation of the subjective phenomena of consciousness has largely
been absent from discussions of the `hard problem'. This is due, apparently,
both to philo- sophical objections to the possibility of such a science
of consciousness, and to the absence of appropriate subjective investigative
methodologies. The present paper argues (1) that cognitive-developmental
research on the development of the mental/physical distinction in young
children undercuts standard philosophical objections to the possibility
of an appropriate scientific study of the phenomena of consciousness, (2)
that methodologies for exploring the contents and dynamics of consciousness
akin to those developed in Eastern cultures could play a significant role
in the development of such a science of consciousness, and (3) that the
experience of `pure consciousness' often reported in association with these
methodologies suggests reformulation of our ordinary ideas about the relationships
between consciousness, qualia, and the objective world that may prove particularly
useful for resolution of the `hard problem'.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.69-75
David Hodgson
Supreme Court of New South Wales,
Queens Square,
Sydney,
NSW 2000,
Australia
Abstract:
David Chalmers distinguishes the hard problem of consciousness — why
should a physical system give rise to conscious experiences at all — with
what he calls the easy problems, the explanation of how cognitive systems,
including human brains, perform various cognitive functions. He argues
that the easy problems are easy because the performance of any function
can be explained by specifying a mechanism that performs the function.
This article argues that conscious experiences have a role in the performance
by human beings of some cognitive functions, that can't be realised by
mechanisms of the kind studied by the objective sciences; and that accordingly
some of Chalmers' easy problems will not be fully solved unless and until
the hard problem is solved.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.76-88
Dept. of Philosophy,
Sycamore 026,
Indiana University,
Bloomington,
IN 47405–2601,
USA.
Email: ghrosenb@phil.indiana.edu
Abstract:
If experience cannot be explained reductively, then we must embrace
a revised understanding of nature to explain it. What kind of revision
is required? A minimal revision would merely append a theory of experience
onto an otherwise adequate theory of cognition, without going far beyond
considerations peculiar to the study of the mind. I argue that we will
need a more expansive revision, requiring us to rethink the natural order
quite generally. If this is right, we will view the mind as a special context
in which something new to our understanding of the world, and much more
general, is being manifested.