This issue also contains some review articles.
JCS, 1 (2), 1994, pp. 168-81
Harald Atmanspacher,
Max-Planck-Institut fuer extraterrestrische Physik,
D–85740 Garching,
Germany.
Email: haa@mpe-garching.mpg.de
Abstract:
The relevance of the Cartesian cut as a conceptual tool to separate
matter and mind in the tradition of a dualistic world view is addressed.
Modern science has developed an increasing number of concepts requiring
that such a cut be considered neither as a priori prescribed nor as impenetrable.
Two important examples are the concepts of complexity and meaning.
They are subjects of physics as the science of matter and cognitive
science as the science of the mind, respectively. Their mutual relationships
are discussed to some detail, and certain elements of a `post-Cartesian'
way of thinking are indicated.
JCS, 1 (2), 1994, pp. 182-195
Donald Michie,
University of Edinburgh,
UK
Email: D.Michie@ed.ac.uk
Abstract:
Consciousness has been widely regarded as the central arena for the
mental solution of problems. A variant view locates the business end of
problem solving elsewhere, with conscious intervention only for intermittent
monitoring and goal-setting. In this scenario conscious awareness, with
`intelligent' processes generally, is largely specialized to the construction
and communication of appropriate after-the-event histories and explanations.The
first part of the paper traces a long march undertaken by main-stream artificial
intelligence basing itself on the first assumption. Disappointment with
the result has prompted interest in the second view, which forms the main
topic of Part 2 (JCS, 2 (1), 1995, pp. 52-66).
JCS, 1 (2), 1994, pp. 196-200
Todd C. Moody,
Department of Philosophy,
St. Joseph's University,
5600 City Avenue,
Philadelphia,
PA 19119,
USA.
Email: tmoody@sjuphil.sju.edu
Abstract:
The problem of `conscious inessentialism' is examined in the literature,
and an argument is presented that the presence of consciousness is indeed
marked by a behavioural difference, but that this should be looked for
at the cultural level of speech communities.
JCS, 1 (2), 1994, pp. 201-204
Euan J. Squires,
Department of Mathematical Sciences,
University of Durham,
Durham DH1 3LE,
UK
Email: e.j.squires@durham.ac.uk
Abstract:
It is argued that the main reason why quantum theory is relevant to
consciousness is that the theory cannot be completely defined without introducing
some features of consciousness.
JCS, 1 (2), 1994, pp. 205-216
David Hodgson,
Supreme Court of New South Wales,
Queens Square,
Sydney,
NSW 2000,
Australia
Abstract:
This article looks at two approaches to the human brain and to the
causation of behaviour: the objective approach of neuroscience, which treats
the brain as a physical system operating in accordance with physical laws
of general application; and the subjective approach of folk psychology,
which treats people, and thus their brains and minds, as making choices
or decisions on the basis of beliefs, desires, etc. It suggests three ways
in which these two approaches might be related, two physicalist and one
non-physicalist; and argues, with reference to ethical and legal issues,
that there are strong commonsense grounds for preferring the non-physicalist
alternative, and that science does not justify its rejection. It is suggested
that a considerable onus of proof lies on proponents of physicalist approaches,
having regard to the implications of such approaches for important issues
of justice and human rights.In this paper, I outline two approaches to
the human brain, involving two different views of the causation of human
behaviour; and I consider how these two approaches might be linked or related.
The first is the objective approach of neuroscience, which treats
the human brain as a physical object, operating in accordance with the
same physical laws as other physical objects. The second is the subjective
approach of folk psychology, which we apply both in our ordinary interactions
with other people and in our thinking about our own behaviour; and which
treats people (and so their brains and minds) as choosing or deciding what
to do on the basis of their beliefs, desires and so on.
JCS, 1 (2), 1994, pp. 217-229
Christian de Quincey,
Institute of Noetic Sciences,
475 Gate Five Road,
Suite 300,
Sausalito,
CA 94965,
USA
Abstract:
This paper examines two objections by Colin McGinn to panexperientialist
metaphysics as a solution to the mind-body problem. It begins by briefly
stating how the `ontological problem' of the mind-body relationship is
central to the philosophy of mind, summarizes the difficulties with dualism
and materialism, and outlines the main tenets of panexperientialism. Panexperientialists,
such as David Ray Griffin, claim that theirs is one approach to solving
the mind-body problem which does not get stuck in accounting for interaction
(as in dualism) nor in the difficulties with emergentism and epiphenomenalism
(as in materialism). McGinn attacks panexperientialism on two fronts: (1)
the Whiteheadian distinction between `consciousness' and `experience' and
the notion of consciousness emerging from `non-conscious experience'; and
(2) the implicit `absurdities' inherent in the notion of experience and
self-agency in the fundamental particles of physics. Griffin's defence
fails to satisfactorily address challenge (1); though a model is presented
by the author which may offer panexperientialism a way out. McGinn's challenge
(2) is an attempted reductio which Griffin rejects: that panexperientialism
contradicts the evidence of modern quantum- relativistic physics. The author's
analysis of the opposing positions shows that both philosophers are arguing
from incompatible `geometries of discourse' and radically inconsistent
metaphysical assumptions. The paper concludes that a resolution of both
the mind-body problem in general, and of the McGinn-Griffin dispute in
particular, needs to involve an epistemological shift to include extra-rational
ways of knowing.
JCS, 1 (2), 1994, pp. 241-249
Roger Penrose,
University of Oxford,
Mathematical Institute
24–29 St. Giles,
Oxford OX1 3LB,
UK
Abstract:
The following is an edited version of Roger Penrose's lecture at the
Fifth Mind and Brain Symposium at the Institute of Psychiatry, London,
on 29 October 1994, introducing the themes of his recent book Shadows
of the Mind. The talk begins by outlining some options for the modelling
of the relationship between consciousness and computation, and provides
evidence for a model in which it is not possible even in principle to simulate
mathematical understanding computationally. It is argued that mathematical
understanding is on a continuum with consciousness in general, and that
non-computability is a feature of all consciousness. The talk then goes
on to outline some of the problems of the relationship between quantum
and classical physics and proposes a new theory of `objective reduction'
by quantum gravity to bridge the explanatory gap. The talk concludes by
examining cytoskeletal microtubules as a possible site for quantum-coherent
events in the brain. It is suggested that this might be the physical basis
of conscious events.
JCS, 1 (2), 1994, pp. 253-5
Friedrich Beck,
Institut fuer Kernphysik,
Technische Hochschule Darmstadt,
D-64289 Darmstadt,
Germany.
Email: beck@crunch.ikp.physik.th-darmstadt.de
Abstract:
The first issue of JCS published an interview with Roger Penrose
on his recent book Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science
of Consciousness (Clark, 1994). In it Professor Penrose, among other
subjects, presented his views on the role of quantum mechanics on our way
towards a better understanding of brain functioning and its relation to
consciousness. In this note we comment on some aspects of his reasoning.
JCS, 1 (2), 1994, pp. 264-74
David Hodgson,
Supreme Court of New South Wales,
Queens Square,
Sydney,
NSW 2000,
Australia
Abstract:
This is a review article about John Searle's most recent book The
Rediscovery of the Mind, which criticizes it for not going far enough
in its departure from orthodox materialistic views of the brain and mind.
It argues that Searle's two central propositions, (1) consciousness is
irreducible and (2) consciousness cannot cause anything that cannot be
explained by the causal behaviour of neurons, are incompatible; and suggests
that it is reasonable and scientifically respectable to reject the latter
rather than the former.
Home
page
JCS
Home Page