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Home Page JCS, 2 (2), 1995, pp. 99-112
Roger Penrose,
Oxford University,
Mathematical Institute, 24–29 St. Giles,
Oxford
OX1 3LB, UK
Stuart Hameroff,
Departments of Anesthesiology and Psychology,
University of Arizona,
Tucson, AZ 85724,
USA.
Email: srh@ccit.arizona.edu
Abstract:
Grush and Churchland (1995) attempt to address aspects of the proposal
that we have been making concerning a possible physical mechanism underlying
the phenomenon of consciousness. Unfortunately, they employ arguments that
are highly misleading and, in some important respects, factually incorrect.
Their article `Gaps in Penrose's Toilings' is addressed specifically at
the writings of one of us (Penrose), but since the particular model they
attack is one put forward by both of us (Hameroff and Penrose, 1995; 1996),
it is appropriate that we both reply; but since our individual remarks
refer to different aspects of their criticism we are commenting on their
article separately. The logical arguments discussed by Grush and Churchland,
and the related physics are answered in Part 1 by Penrose, largely by pointing
out precisely where these arguments have already been treated in detail
in Shadows of the Mind (Penrose, 1994). In Part 2, Hameroff replies
to various points on the biological side, showing for example how they
have seriously misunderstood what they refer to as `physiological evidence'
regarding effects of the drug colchicine. The reply serves also to discuss
aspects of our model `orchestrated objective reduction in brain microtubules
- Orch OR' which attempts to deal with the serious problems of consciousness
more directly and completely than any previous theory.
JCS, 2 (2), 1995, pp. 113-142
Guven Guzeldere,
1 Department of Philosophy
and Center for the Study of Language and Information,
Stanford University,
Stanford, CA 94305,
USA
Email: guven@csli.stanford.edu
Abstract:
This article is the second and final part of a general introduction
to the concept, history, and problems of consciousness. The first was an
overview of the study of consciousness in the history of psychology; this
essay attempts to lay out the contemporary problems of consciousness and
uncover their philosophical foundations. Together they serve as a prelude
to the forthcoming special issue `Explaining Consciousness — The Hard Problem'.
JCS, 2 (2), 1995, pp. 148-165
Rafael E. Nunez,
Institute of Cognitive Studies,
University of California,
Berkeley,
CA 94720,
USA.
Email: nunez@csli.stanford.edu
Abstract:
Mainstream cognitive science shows a strong tendency to explain the
mind by postulating a level of analysis separate from the biological and
the sociological, and by assuming that the idea of computation is essential.
John Searle has challenged these assumptions and suggested a solution to
the mind–body problem (biological naturalism). I endorse his view that
mental phenomena, consciousness and cognition, are genuine biological phenomena,
but argue that Searle ignores some important entailments relative to essential
features of the living phenomenon. First, these entailments are in conflict
with the objectivistic tradition on which Searle's work rests. This reveals
a more serious problem underlying basic assumptions of cognitive science
and the philosophy of mind: the inadequacy of ontological objectivism.
Secondly, they point to the fact that biological naturalism ignores the
very interactive and co-defining nature of biological systems that take
place beyond the level of the individual. As a consequence it is incomplete
in its foundations and limited in its ability to account for sociocultural
processes as inseparable constituents of the mind. To overcome these difficulties
a view is outlined (ecological naturalism) that gives a coherent account
of the mind and cognition without endorsing objectivism. This view emphasizes
the non-separation between the mind and the medium in which it evolves,
their biological co-definition, and also the supra-individual nature of
the biology of mental phenomena.
JCS, 2 (2), 1995, pp. 166-178
Dipankar Home,
Homi Bhabha Fellow,
Bose Institute,
93/1 Acharya Prafulla Chandra Road,
Calcutta 700 009,
India
Andrew Robinson,
Literary Editor,
The Times Higher Education Supplement,
66-68 East Smithfield,
London E1 9XY,
UK
Abstract:
Discussions on the nature of reality between Albert Einstein and Rabindranath
Tagore, Bengali poet, philosopher and Nobel laureate, have provoked interest
among both physicists and philosophers since their first publication in
1930/31. This article points out their relevance to past and present debates
about the meaning of quantum mechanics.
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