JCS, 3 ( 4) 1996 , pp. 357-373
Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061-0126, USA
It seems that we could be physically the same as we are now, only we would lack conscious awareness. If so, then nothing about our physical world is necessary for qualitative experience. However, a proper analysis of psychological functionalism eliminates this problem concerning the possibility of zombies. ‘Friends of absent qualia’ rely on an overly simple view of what counts as a functional analysis and of the function/structure distinction. The level of thought is not the only level at which one might perform a functional analysis; all that is required for some description of a state to be functional is that it be defined in terms of its causal relations. Insofar as functionalism is not restricted to a higher level of analysis (hence, any causal interaction could conceivably be found in a functional description), then successful theories of consciousness should include whatever it is that makes those states have a qualitative character.
JCS, 3 ( 4) 1996 , pp. 350-356
Arthur J. Deikman, Department of Psychiatry, University of California,
Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, 401 Parnassus Avenue, San Francisco,
USA
deikman@itsa.ucsf.edu
Introspection reveals that the core of subjectivity -- the ‘I’ -- is identical to awareness. This ‘I’ should be differentiated from the various aspects of the physical person and its mental contents which form the ‘self’. Most discussions of consciousness confuse the ‘I’ and the ‘self’. In fact, our experience is fundamentally dualistic -- not the dualism of mind and matter -- but that of the ‘I’ and that which is observed. The identity of awareness and the ‘I’ means that we know awareness by being it, thus solving the problem of the infinite regress of observers. It follows that whatever our ontology of awareness may be, it must also be the same for ‘I’.
JCS, 3 ( 4) 1996 , pp. 330-349
Francisco J. Varela, LENA (Laboratoire des Neurosciences Cognitives),
CNRS URA 654, Hopital de la Salpetriere, 47 Blvd. de l’Hopital, 75651 Paris
Cedex 13, France.
fv@ccr.jussieu.fr
This paper starts with one of Chalmers’ basic points: first-hand experience is an irreducible field of phenomena. I claim there is no ‘theoretical fix’ or ‘extra ingredient’ in nature that can possibly bridge this gap. Instead, the field of conscious phenomena requires a rigorous method and an explicit pragmatics for its exploration and analysis. My proposed approach, inspired by the style of inquiry of phenomenology, I have called neurophenomenology. It seeks articulations by mutual constraints between phenomena present in experience and the correlative field of phenomena established by the cognitive sciences. It needs to expand into a widening research community in which the method is cultivated further.
JCS, 3 ( 4) 1996 , pp. 313-329
Piet Hut, School of Natural Sciences, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540-0631, USA. Email: piet@sns.ias.edu
Roger N. Shepard, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-2130, USA. Email: roger@psych.stanford.edu
Instead of speaking of conscious experience as arising in a brain, we prefer to speak of a brain as arising in conscious experience. From an epistemological standpoint, starting from direct experiences strikes us as more justified. As a first option, we reconsider the ‘hard problem’ of the relation between conscious experience and the physical world by thus turning that problem upside down. We also consider a second option: turning the hard problem sideways. Rather than starting with the third-person approach used in physics, or the first- person approach of starting with individual conscious experience, we consider starting from an I-and-you basis, centered around the second-person. Finally, we present a candidate for what could be considered to underlie conscious experience: ‘sense’. We consider this to be a shot in the dark, but at least a shot in the right direction: somewhere between upside down and sideways. Our notion of sense can be seen as an alternative to panpsychism. To give an analogy, using the notions of space and time is more convenient than trying to analyse the phenomenon of motion in terms of a space-based ‘pandynamism’. Similarly, when approaching the phenomenon of consciousness, we prefer the triad of space, time and sense, over a spacetime-based form of panpsychism.
JCS, 3 ( 4) 1996 , pp. 303-312
Mark C. Price, Dept. of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EB, UK. Email: mcp1004@cus.cam.ac.uk
We tend to assume that progress in answering the ‘hard question’ of consciousness will be accompanied by a subjective feeling of greater understanding. However, in order to feel we understand how one state of affairs arises from another, we have to deceive ourselves into thinking we have found a type of causal link which in reality may not exist (Rosch, 1994). I draw from and expand upon Rosch’s model, which specifies the conditions under which this self-deceptive kind of causal attribution arises. I argue that the mind-body relationship may not meet these conditions, especially because of its potential novelty and uniqueness. We should not therefore expect to subjectively feel we understand consciousness.
JCS, 3 ( 4) 1996 , pp. 290-302
Kieron O’Hara, Artificial Intelligence Group, Dept. of Psychology, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, U.K.
Tom Scutt, ICL Information Technology, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
The paper attempts to establish the importance of addressing what Chalmers (1995) calls the ‘easy problems’ of consciousness, at the expense of the ‘hard problem’. One pragmatic argument and two philosophical arguments are presented to defend this approach to consciousness, and three major theories of consciousness are criticized in this light. Finally, it is shown that concentration on the easy problems does not lead to eliminativism with respect to consciousness.
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