JCS, 5 ( 3 ), 1998 ,pp. 260-94
Sheets-Johnstone M. Department of Philosophy, University of Oregon,
Eugene, OR 97403, USA msj@oregon.uoregon.edu
Thomas Nagel, in a review of John Searle's (1992) book, The Rediscovery
of the Mind, states that `we do not really understand the claim that
mental states are states of the brain'. He follows this statement more
finely with the remark that, `We are still unable to form a conception
of how consciousness arises in matter' (Nagel, 1993, p. 40). The
missing conception is, of course, really a missing answer: How does
consciousness arise in matter? Nagel implicitly raises the question at
the culmination of a discussion of what he categorizes as Searle's first
arguments against materialists. He lays out these arguments after summarizing
Searle's view of how various theories of mind have attempted to reduce
the mental to the physical and of how they all fail to take consciousness
into account. Without an account of consciousness, according to Searle,
none of the theories can rightfully claim to be a theory of mind. Quoting
Searle, Nagel points out that `The crucial question is not ``Under what
conditions would we attribute mental states to other people?'' but
rather, ``What is it that people actually have when they have mental
states?'' ' (p. 38). Nagel's agreement with Searle that `the subjective'
is precisely the crucial question to address is exemplified in his recognizably-worded
statement that `Facts about your external behavior or the electrical activity
or functional organization of your brain may be closely connected with
your conscious experiences, but they are not facts about what it's like
for you to hear a police siren' (p. 39, italics added). The question of
`how consciousness arises in matter' thus appears absolutely central
for both Nagel and Searle.
In this paper I outline basic reasons for thinking the question spurious. This critical work will allow me to pinpoint troublesome issues within the context of definitions of life and in turn address the properly constructive task of this essay: to demonstrate how genuine understandings of consciousness demand close and serious study of evolution as a history of animate form. I should note that this demonstration will omit a consideration of botany, though plant life is indisputably part of an evolutionary history of animate form. The omission has nothing to do with importance, but with keeping a manageable focus on the question of consciousness; and it has nothing to do either with a trivialization of the ways in which plants are animate, but with an intentional narrowing of the complexity of an already complex subject. As will be shown in the concluding section, the demonstration has sizable implications for cognitivists generally and for philosophers in particular, notably: (1) a need to re-think the common assumption that unconsciousness historically preceded consciousness; (2) a need to delve as deeply and seriously into natural history as into brains and their computational analogues; (3) a critical stance toward arm-chair judgments about consciousness and a correlative turn toward corporeal matters of fact.
JCS, 5 ( 3 ), 1998 ,pp. 295-308
Shanon B. Dept. of Psychology, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
msshanon@pluto.mscc.huji.ac.il
This paper proposes an answer to the title question on the basis of
the analysis of empirical data -- a large corpus of what I call thought
sequences, namely, trains of verbal-like expressions that spontaneously
pass through people's minds. The analysis reveals several patterns that
could not have occurred had thought not been conducted in a conscious manner.
The feature that makes these patterns possible is the concreteness resulting
from the articulation of thought in a particular medium: such articulation
is perforce conscious. In practically all standard models of cognition
today the substrate of cognitive activity is abstract, and, indeed, consciousness
is usually not accounted for (in fact, cannot be accounted for). Here,
I show that non-abstractness of mentation provides for three important
functional benefits. First, the local de-coupling of medium and content
opens the possibility of thought progressing along lines not planned or
envisioned by the thinker beforehand, and thus it is a key for the generation
of novelty. Second, articulated thought creates a medium for activities
carried out in the internal theatre of the mind that are analogous to activities
carried out in the real world. Third, articulation provides for the quality
of entitihood, hence for compartmentalization and enhanced control as well
as for reflection and meta-observation. The discussion is grounded in a
general critique of the conceptual foundations of cognition that regards
action in the world, not computational operation applied upon abstract
underlying symbolic representations, as the basic capability of the human
cognitive system.
JCS, 5 ( 3 ), 1998 ,pp. 309-327
Rao K.R. Institute for Yoga & Consciousness, Andhra University,
Visakhapatnam, India.
Two dominant perspectives on consciousness representing the eastern and
the western viewpoints are discussed. In the western scholarly tradition,
(a) consciousness is generally equated with the mind; (b) intentionality
is regarded as its defining characteristic; and (c) the goal is one of
seeking rational understanding of what consciousness/mind is. In the eastern
tradition, as represented by the Indian approach to the study of consciousness,
(a) consciousness and mind are considered to be different; (b) consciousness
as such is believed to be nonintentional while the mind is regarded as
intentional; and (c) the goal is one of developing practical methods for
transformation of the human condition via realization of consciousness
as such. It is suggested that consciousness encompasses two different domains,
the transcendental and the phenomenal, and that humans enjoy dual citizenship
in them. The eastern and western viewpoints each seems to be directed more
toward one domain than the other, resulting in a biased emphasis. Seen
as complementary rather than in opposition to each other, the eastern and
the western perspectives may give us a more comprehensive understanding
of consciousness and its role in our being.
JCS, 5 ( 3 ), 1998 ,pp. 344-354
Nunn C.M.H. Barfad Beag, Ardfern, Argyll PA31 8QN chrisnunn@compuserve.com
This paper starts with an overview of C.G. Jung's notion of archetypes.
His ideas imply that Jungian archetypes can be viewed as the most general
examples of the shared awarenesses that occur in groups of people of all
sizes, ranging from families to humanity as a whole. The term 'archetype'
is used in connection with such shared awarenesses in the subsequent discussion.
The distinction that Jung made between archetypal representations and archetypes
themselves is retained and emphasized. It is then pointed out that archetypal
representations are sets of Dawkins' memes appearing in awareness. Pursuing
the line of thought suggested by this, it is further proposed that the
meme set can be regarded as analogous to the genotype in biology, while
the representation itself resembles the phenotype in heuristically useful
respects. Archetypes, as opposed to their representations, are the factors
which predispose particular sets of memes to spread within a group of people
and enter their awarenesses. It follows from the biological analogy that
archetypes can be thought of as regularities that occur in an 'ecology'
of representations. Because memes are subject to pseudo-Darwinian influences,
parallels between the behaviour of representations and the phenomena of
parasitology and epidemiology will sometimes be observed. The view of archetypes
arrived at opens up a possibility that they might be responsible for some
mass behaviours; e.g. those involved in the production of social movements
such as Nazism or certain medical conditions of obscure aetiology. Archetypal
representations possess in some circumstances the power to fill the consciousnesses
of individuals 'infected' by them for long periods of time. These points
are illustrated in a brief account of fatigue syndromes. Finally, should
consciousness have a quantum theoretical basis, details of the epidemiology
of arche- typal representations will differ from those to be expected if
it has no such basis. The pheno- menon of alien abduction, presumed to
be of archetypal origin, is discussed as an example.
JCS, 5 ( 3 ), 1998 ,pp. 355-61
Atmanspacher H. Max-Planck-Institut für extraterrestriche Physik,
D-85740 Garching, Germany haa@mpe-garching.mpg.de
The concept of archetypes has received a number of fundamentally different
interpretations, and there are numerous additional philosophical concepts
which can be characterized as modifications of those interpretations. Chris
Nunn's paper (Nunn, 1998) represents an approach to bringing a specific
one among those concepts -- Richard Dawkins' neo-Darwinistic conception
of memes (Dawkins, 1976) -- into contact with the notion of archetypes
as it has been mainly popularized by Carl Gustav Jung. Nunn states rightly
that Jung's own understanding of and emphasis on archetypes changed considerably
during his lifetime. Therefore the difficulty is not only how to relate
memes to archetypes, but also to distinguish that concept of archetypes
to which memes relate from those to which they do not.
JCS, 5 ( 3 ), 1998 ,pp. 362-374
Wheelwell D.
This is a commentary on 'Archetypes and memes: Their structure, relationships
and behaviours', by C.M.H. Nunn (1998) and (more briefly) on the commentary
upon it by Harald Atmanspacher (1998). Let us start with faint praise.
Nunn writes well and engages themes that are sure to interest many readers.
He is well informed, shows sensitivity to the evolution and elusiveness
of Jung's thought, as well as to the history of medicine, and he (almost)
has one good idea. Atmanspacher plays upon the same themes, also seems
well informed, and (also almost) has a good idea, though he writes more
awkwardly. In brief, Nunn relates Jung's archetypes to (Dennett's version
of) Dawkins' memes and suggests an epidemiological angle, Atmanspacher
suggests a hierarchical arrangement of memes, and I suggest they are talking
dangerous jabberwocky.